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THE UNDERAPPRECIATED IMPORTANCE OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN DELAWARE’S SUCCESS
Eric A. Chiappinelli*
“Let me first say that I hate, hate, the wastefulness and wheel
spinning that is engendered by multijurisdictional class litigation
of this type, right down to the bottom of my narrow,
penny-pinching soul do I hate it.”1
INTRODUCTION
The judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery are in a full-on of-
fensive mode.  They believe, and some hard evidence suggests, that
stockholder litigation involving Delaware corporations is no longer
being filed as robustly in the Court of Chancery as it once was.  The
judges are not shy about making it known that stockholder litigation
involving Delaware corporations should be filed in Delaware only.
Cases filed elsewhere are a bad thing.2
By some measures, Delaware has been losing cases for about the
last ten years, although the extent and nature of this litigation exodus
have not been definitively established.  Whether Delaware is actually
seeing fewer cases or whether it is seeing a smaller percentage of
* Frank McDonald Endowed Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.  I
benefitted greatly from the participants in the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop held
in Chicago on November 8 and 9, 2013 and especially to Professors Jessica Erickson and Verity
Winship, who organized and hosted the workshop.  Thanks also to the organizers and partici-
pants at the fifth annual National Business Law Scholars Conference held at Loyola Law School
on June 19 and 20, 2014.  I also presented this Article, and received useful input, at lunchtime
faculty presentations at the law schools of Texas Tech, the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville,
and the University of Oklahoma.  Thanks also to Kyle Wagner Compton, editor of The Chancery
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1. Transcript of Teleconference on Defendants’ Motion to Proceed in One Jurisdiction at 19,
In re MAKO Surgical Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 8958-VCG (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2013)
[hereinafter Transcript of Teleconference] (statement of V.C. Sam Glasscock III).
2. See, e.g., id. at 19–20; Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 56, In re
Burlington N. Santa Fe S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 5043-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (statement
of V.C. J. Travis Laster); Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litiga-
tion: Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 27 & n.111 (2012);
Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Jason S. Tyler, Docket Dividends: Growth in Shareholder Litigation
Leads to Refinements in Chancery Procedures, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473, 506–10 (2013) (lead
author is a Vice Chancellor); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-
Filed Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1 (2013) (lead author is the former Chancellor, and is the current
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court).
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stockholder litigation is unclear.  Moreover, there is a qualitative as-
pect to this question as well as a quantitative one.  Whether Delaware
is retaining the important cases is a question that is currently keenly
debated.
Whether Delaware remains the center of stockholder litigation has
real consequences for Delaware and for corporate law.  Delaware, as
is well known, is the leader in pseudo-domestic incorporations.3  That
position is important to Delaware because those corporations gener-
ate roughly one-fifth of Delaware’s annual tax revenue.4  Further, the
Delaware bar and the judiciary have obvious professional interests in
Delaware’s dominance and prominence.5
One of the main reasons that Delaware is the pseudo-domestic in-
corporation capital is that it is the center of stockholder litigation.
Academics “have long agreed that Delaware’s dominance is a result
of its law and its judiciary.  As a corollary, it was widely understood
that Delaware courts decided most cases involving Delaware corpora-
tions.”6  Most scholars who have looked at the question conclude that
Delaware is not in danger of losing its hegemony in pseudo-domestic
corporations.7  Over 80% of all pseudo-domestic corporations are in-
corporated in Delaware; the second-most popular state is Nevada,
with only 8.03%.8  Some scholars, though, theorize that another state,
most likely Nevada, could eventually challenge Delaware as the home
of at least some kinds of pseudo-domestic corporations.9  Delaware’s
loss of litigation need not mean that another forum is becoming the
3. A corporation that has its headquarters and principal place of business in state A, but is
incorporated in state B, is, as to state B, a pseudo-domestic corporation.  As to state A, it is a
pseudo-foreign corporation.  Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer,
Beyond Nicastro, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 783, 788 n.29 (2013).
4. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Cor-
porate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 67 (2009).
5. See id. at 69–74.
6. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (2013) (footnote omitted); see also John Armour et al., Delaware’s
Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1347 (2012) [hereinafter Armour et al., Balancing Act]; John
Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 606 (2012)
[hereinafter Armour et al., Losing Cases]; John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Compe-
tition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1951–52 (2012).
7. Brian JM Quinn, Arbitration and the Future of Delaware’s Corporate Law Franchise, 14
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829, 830 (2013) (citing Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices
of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002)).
8. Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting Into Lax Law
39–40 tbl.1 (Dec. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1644974.  As of 2011, Maryland (1.52%) is the only other state that has more than 1% of the
total pseudo-domestic incorporations. Id.
9. Id.
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litigation center. It is entirely possible that this litigation will not be-
come centered in any particular forum, but rather will be divided
among the state and federal courts in states in which public corpora-
tions have their headquarters.
Nonetheless, if Delaware continues to lose cases, the damage to
Delaware will be nearly as severe as if another state were supplanting
Delaware because a key to continued judicial expertise in a particular
area is a constant flow of relevant lawsuits.10  Both scholars and judges
agree that caseflow is vital to Delaware’s preeminent position in cor-
poration law.
Until recently, Delaware’s claim to be the center of stockholder liti-
gation seemed impregnable, but actually it is much more fragile than
is generally realized.  I document in Parts II and III that Delaware’s
position as the center of stockholder litigation did not come about
until forty years after it became the undisputed leader in pseudo-do-
mestic incorporations.  New York became the first center of modern
stockholder litigation in the 1920s and ’30s.  New York purposefully
discouraged such lawsuits, however, in the mid-1940s.  Delaware had
the institutional, substantive, and procedural requisites to be attrac-
tive to the plaintiffs’ bar, and by the mid-1960s it was the most popular
state for stockholder litigation.
An underappreciated, nearly ignored fact is that the lynchpin of
both New York’s and Delaware’s leadership in stockholder litigation
was the ease and assurance with which fiduciaries could be sued.  That
is, both New York’s and Delaware’s success depended upon personal
jurisdiction.  Delaware’s approach to personal jurisdiction, sequestra-
tion, was essentially unique; other states could not effectively replicate
it.  When Shaffer v. Heitner declared sequestration to be unconstitu-
tional in 1977,11 Delaware adopted a director consent statute that, as I
have argued elsewhere, is also unconstitutional.12  I discuss Dela-
ware’s reaction to Shaffer in Part IV.  I argue in Part V that Delaware
should adopt a new amenability statute that is both constitutional and
effective in subjecting fiduciaries to personal jurisdiction.  Moreover,
the value to Delaware of my proposed statute could not effectively be
duplicated by other states.
10. See Parsons, Jr. & Tyler, supra note 2, at 478; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-
Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 131 (2009); Stevelman, supra note 4, at 62; Matthew D. Cain &
Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation 30 (Jan.
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758. See generally
Coyle, supra note 6, at 1927–33.
11. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
12. See generally Chiappinelli, supra note 3.
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To continue as the center of stockholder litigation, the Delaware
Court of Chancery has taken at least seven steps to either encourage
or coerce litigation in Delaware, which I also detail in Part V.  The
Court of Chancery has become more generous in its award of attor-
ney’s fees to entice plaintiffs to file in Delaware.13  The court has also
suggested to corporations that they insert forum selection clauses in
their bylaws or certificates of incorporation, which would require
stockholder litigation to be filed in Delaware.14
The Court of Chancery judges have also taken more direct mea-
sures to curtail multiforum litigation, too.  They have made it clear
that they will not facilitate sweetheart settlements approved by courts
in other states.15  One Vice Chancellor has refused to give full faith
and credit to a California settlement, although the Delaware Supreme
Court reversed.16  Chief Justice Strine has suggested that the rules of
forum non conveniens and the “first-filed rule” for determining which
jurisdiction should proceed first with litigation be modified to, in ef-
fect, ensure that Delaware judges control multiforum litigation.17  Fi-
nally, the Delaware General Assembly has tried to entice stockholder
litigation to Delaware and away from other states by providing a con-
fidential arbitration procedure presided over by a sitting member of
the Court of Chancery.18  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that procedure unconstitutional, but did so in majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions that leave open the possibility that
a revised arbitration provision could be found to be constitutional.19
Despite these measures, without a secure solution to its personal
jurisdiction issue, Delaware is at risk of permanently losing its position
as the center of stockholder litigation.  Adopting my proposal, how-
ever, would help to convince the plaintiffs’ bar that Delaware is both
13. See, e.g., Revised Final Order and Judgment, In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Deriv.
Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) (C.A. No. 961-CS), aff’d sub nom. Am. Mining Corp. v.
Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
14. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010); see also Boiler-
makers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
15. See Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 16–31, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology
Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 5890-VCL (Dec. 17, 2010).
16. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 357 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d, 74 A.3d
612 (Del. 2013).
17. See Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 2, at 7–8; see also Transcript of Teleconference, supra note
1, at 19–20 (statement of V.C. Sam Glasscock III); Transcript of Teleconference on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Expedite, In re MAKO Surgical Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 8958-VCG (Del.
Ch. Nov. 4, 2013); Transcript of the Court’s Ruling, In re MAKO Surgical Corp. Stockholders
Litig., C.A. No. 8958-VCG (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013).
18. Act of April 2, 2009, ch.8, § 1, 77 Del. Laws 9 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349
(2013)).
19. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
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serious about attracting stockholder litigation and capable of provid-
ing a litigation environment in which personal jurisdiction over the
fiduciaries is assured.  Without addressing the personal jurisdiction
problem, Delaware remains vulnerable to the possibility that head-
quarters states will garner stockholder litigation, at least in part be-
cause personal jurisdiction over the fiduciary defendants is more
assured.
II. THE RISE OF MODERN STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION
A. The Causes and Predicates of Modern Stockholder Litigation
Stockholder litigation has been a fixture of the American legal sys-
tem for over 150 years.20  But modern stockholder litigation can trace
its origins only to the Jazz Age.  Even before World War I, at least
some small stockholders brought derivative suits against corporate fi-
duciaries in ways that presaged the modern era.21  Paul Cravath, the
legendary corporate lawyer, described the stockholder-plaintiffs in
these actions as strikers, which he defined as “a person who seeks by
creating a nuisance value for himself to force the payment of an
amount wholly disproportionate to his interest in the [corporation] as
the price of the withdrawal of the nuisance of his presence.”22
The strike suit was well established by the end of World War I.
Cravath observed in 1917 that “[t]here are a certain number of men
who make it a profession to watch reorganizations and other large
corporate transactions with a view to instituting litigation at some crit-
ical moment in the hope of creating nuisance value for themselves.”23
What separates these strike suits from modern litigation is that the
striker was the animating factor in the litigation.  He or she chose the
corporations to sue and directed the litigation.24
In modern stockholder litigation, however, the plaintiff owns a very
small amount of stock and does not initiate or control the litigation.
20. See Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 985–92 (1957).
21. Perhaps the most famous such stockholder-plaintiff was Clarence Venner, whose career as
a corporate litigant flourished from about 1900 to 1920.  1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH
FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819–1947, at 620–21 (1946) (explaining that, in 1907, Venner
“was becoming a perennial plaintiff in minority stockholder litigation, a field which he made
highly profitable during the first two decades of the 20th Century”); see also Obituary, Clarence
Venner, Litigant, is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1933, at 15.
22. Paul D. Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders’
Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of Corpo-
rations, in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULA-
TION 153, 202 (1917).
23. Id.
24. Again, Venner was a paradigm of this style of litigant. See Obituary, supra note 21.
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This typically means small in both the sense of the plaintiff’s stock’s
worth and, more importantly, small in the sense that it represents a
miniscule percentage of the corporation’s outstanding shares.  In mod-
ern stockholder litigation, the lawyer is the person who identifies the
corporation that is to be the defendant, finds a stockholder willing to
be the named plaintiff, and negotiates the settlement.  In effect, the
lawyer is the client even though in form the lawyer acts for the named
plaintiff and the other stockholders.25  Stockholder litigation of all
sorts was significant enough to warrant scholarly scrutiny by the mid-
1920s.26  It is unclear exactly when this modern, lawyer-driven form of
stockholder litigation began, but it was recognized by the early 1930s
in the academic literature.27
Two conditions were necessary to transform traditional stockholder
litigation into the modern form.  First, a sufficient supply of pliant
plaintiffs had to exist.  Second, stockholders, or those lawyers who
wished to represent them, had to learn of possible wrongdoing by cor-
porate fiduciaries.28  The first condition did not obtain until about
1920 or so.  The second condition was not reliably in place until 1934.
Stockholders with holdings small enough to be willing to let their
lawyers decide every aspect of the litigation were probably not numer-
ous until the post-World War I dispersion of stockholdings.  After the
War, for the first time, the common stock of large corporations was
marketed in earnest to individual investors located outside the princi-
pal financial cities of the Northeast.29  For the first time, large corpo-
rations frequently had no stockholders with any significant percentage
of stock.  Further, the stockholders of these corporations were dis-
persed throughout the country.  Stockholders with a significant pro-
portion of their wealth invested in a particular company were
obviously much less likely to abdicate all litigation decisions to legal
25. See J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 673, 692–93 (2008); see also Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1364 & n.71;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
677–78 (1986).
26. See, e.g., Garrard Glenn, The Stockholder’s Suit—Corporate and Individual Grievances, 33
YALE L.J. 580 (1924).
27. See, e.g., Churchill Rodgers & Littleton Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations
Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 589 (1933); Note, Extortionate
Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1308, 1310 n.8 (1934).
28. See Note, supra note 27, at 1308–10.
29. See JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 177 (1997); see also VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HIS-
TORY 249–54 (1970).
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counsel than were stockholders who had a relatively small proportion
of wealth in a particular company’s shares.
The second precondition to modern stockholder litigation was the
public availability of information suggesting corporate wrongdoing.30
Until the mid-1930s, such information typically became available in
three situations.  First, and perhaps most typically, large corporations
were sometimes forced to reorganize as economic downturns periodi-
cally roiled the American economy.  Reorganization was typically ef-
fected outside of federal bankruptcy laws and involved privately
ordered negotiations between the embarrassed corporation and its va-
rious creditors, often debt-holders.31  Stockholders frequently charged
that the corporate fiduciaries were breaching their duties in the terms
of the deals they struck.32  Stockholder litigation increased following
the major recession in 1921, and, of course, the Great Depression fol-
lowing the 1929 stock market crash.33
Second, when a corporation entered into a fundamental transaction
in which the stockholders were required to vote, potential plaintiffs
and their counsel were alerted to possible conflicts of interest or other
overreaching by corporate fiduciaries.  Third, the occasional govern-
mental hearing might disclose evidence of wrongdoing upon which a
stockholder might predicate a viable lawsuit.34
With the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,35 stock-
holders finally had a continuing and reliable source of corporate infor-
mation upon which to determine whether a derivative claim for relief
existed.36  From mid-decade onward, modern stockholder litigation
30. See Note, supra note 27, at 1308–10.  On the general lack of public information about
public corporations, see BASKIN & MIRANTI, JR., supra note 29, at 197–200.  On the difficulty of
obtaining such information, see Harris Berlack, Stockholders’ Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35
MICH. L. REV. 597, 603–04 (1937); George D. Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate
Abuse—Present and Future, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 416–20 (1941) [hereinafter Hornstein, Le-
gal Controls].
31. See Cravath, supra note 22, at 154–55.
32. See id. at 202.
33. See 2 SWAINE, supra note 21, at 677 (“For the past hundred years [i.e., since the mid-
nineteenth century] every depression has brought a wave of minority stockholders’ class suits
against corporate directors.”); see also id. at 447 (“During the [1923–1928] boom Cravath clients
were subjected to very little minority stockholders’ litigation.”); Norman Winer, Jurisdiction
Over the Beneficiary Corporation in Stockholders’ Suits, 22 VA. L. REV. 153, 153 (1935).
34. See Hornstein, Legal Controls, supra note 30, at 419; see also Chester B. McLaughlin,
Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder’s Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421, 421 (1937).
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
36. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, JR., supra note 29, at 201; see also George D. Hornstein, Rights of
Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L.J. 942, 949 (1947) [hereinafter Hornstein,
Rights of Stockholders] (noting that stockholder suits “rapidly increased in number after 1933,
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was a constant fact of life for corporate fiduciaries and their counsel.37
By the mid-1940s modern derivative litigation was so common that it
was perceived to be a paradigm practice area for white-shoe corporate
defense firms.38
B. The Personal Jurisdiction Landscape in Stockholder Litigation
Before International Shoe
Almost as soon as stockholder litigation appeared in the mid-nine-
teenth century, the importance of procedural issues and the danger of
abuses,39 quickly became apparent.  Without question, the most im-
portant procedural issue in stockholder litigation was personal juris-
diction.  In the nearly seventy years between Pennoyer v. Neff40 in
1877 and International Shoe Co. v. Washington41 in 1945, the rules for
personal jurisdiction over individuals were clear and largely easy in
application.  A state could assert personal jurisdiction over any person
physically present in the state when served with process;42 any domi-
ciliary, even when absent from the state;43 and anyone who consented,
either in advance or by appearance in a lawsuit.44
No sooner had Pennoyer been decided than the American economy
became national in scope, and after 1900, American culture became
increasingly mobile.45  As a consequence, questions of personal juris-
diction over nonresidents—especially corporations—became increas-
ingly common and plaintiffs became increasingly stymied because of
the states’ inability to obtain personal jurisdiction in many settings.
One of the areas in which the Pennoyer regime was problematic was
personal jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries.  Corporate fiduciaries
when Congressional disclosures made known to stockholders how some directors and officers
were looting their corporations”).
37. See Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders, supra note 36, at 949–50.
38. See 2 SWAINE, supra note 21, at 714–15.
39. See, e.g., City of Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 244–45 (1887) (noting that abuses were so
frequent that the Supreme Court adopted Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. ix (1882), later retained as
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b), to embody the contemporaneous ownership rule and the demand re-
quirement announced in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881)).
40. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
41. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723–28.
43. Personal service was not necessarily required for domiciliaries.  Rather, they could validly
be served through process left at their residence in the forum state. See McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917); see also Austin W. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business
Within a State, 32 HARV. L. REV. 871, 875 & n.25 (1919).
44. See Scott, supra note 43, at 873–74.
45. See, e.g., Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160, 161–63 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). See generally ALFRED D. CHAN-
DLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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have long been indispensable parties in the typical case in which the
stockholder seeks recompense for the corporation from the corporate
fiduciaries who harmed the corporation.46  Personal jurisdiction was
problematic where not all of the directors were domiciled in the forum
state.  Nonresident directors had to be personally served within the
jurisdiction.  If the forum were located where the corporation was
headquartered, service could usually be effected. If the headquarters
were outside the forum state, however, there might be no state with
personal jurisdiction over all of the fiduciaries.
But this problem was somewhat blunted because, although fiducia-
ries are indispensable, their liability is joint and several.  A plaintiff
need not join every wrongdoing fiduciary, though of course recovery
may only be had against those properly joined and served.47  The
plaintiff could choose, for reasons of strategy or practicality (such as
suing the defendants with the deepest pockets) as well as reasons of
procedure, to sue some but not all of the possible fiduciary
defendants.
Personal jurisdiction over the corporation was also required in
stockholder litigation, even when the real defendants were only the
corporate fiduciaries.  It was early on held in state courts48 and au-
thoritatively held by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1873
that the corporation is an indispensable party in derivative litigation.49
Personal jurisdiction over the corporation was a chronic problem
under the Pennoyer regime once the American economy became
more national in scope.  A state could always exercise personal juris-
diction over its domestic corporations.50  Personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations, however, was more complicated.51  A state could
assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only if the cor-
46. See Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428, 436–37 (1903).
47. Chester Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Minority Stockholders as a Means of Corporate Con-
trol, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 692, 722 (1933); see also, e.g., Harden v. E. States Pub. Serv. Co., 122 A.
705, 707 (Del. Ch. 1923).
48. The leading state case is Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
49. City of Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626, 627 (1873) (corporation held indispen-
sable to facilitate receipt of damages from defendants and to preclude the corporation from
filing additional suits against the defendants on the same cause of action); see also Koster v.
(Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522–23 n.2 (1947); George T. Washington,
Stockholders’ Derivative Suits: The Company’s Role, and a Suggestion, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 361,
362 (1940); Note, Joinder of Foreign Corporations in Stockholders’ Derivative Suits, 50 YALE L.J.
1261, 1261 & n.1 (1941); Note, Necessity of Joinder of Corporation in Representative Suit Against
the Directors, 44 YALE L.J. 1091, 1091 (1935).
50. See Scott, supra note 43, at 878.
51. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1877); see also Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S
369, 377–78 (1877).
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poration either consented to jurisdiction or were present within the
forum state.52
The paradigm foreign corporation envisioned in these principles
was one that conducted its operations in other states as well as in the
state of incorporation.  But by 1880 a variation of the foreign corpora-
tion appeared with sufficient regularity to be dealt with separately.
Corporations began to be formed to conduct business only in other
states and not in the state of incorporation.  Presumably the promot-
ers of these corporations understood that the state of incorporation’s
corporate law would govern the internal affairs.
Today we would call these entities “pseudo-foreign corporations”53
or, regarding them from the point of view of the incorporating state,
“pseudo-domestic corporations.”54  In the nineteenth century they
were called “tramp corporations.”55  Three kinds of tramp corpora-
tions presented jurisdictional problems.  First, many, if not most,
tramp corporations were always intended to have their operations in a
single state, though one different from the state of incorporation.
These were simply local business that the promoters chose to incorpo-
rate elsewhere.56
A second kind of tramp corporation was intended to operate in one
state, but its promoters, who were likely to be the directors and senior
officers, were in a second state, and the corporation was incorporated
in yet a third state.  This scenario could come about when, for exam-
ple, eastern entrepreneurs saw a business opportunity in another area
of the country, often with an emerging economy.  For example, New
York businessmen might incorporate a firm in Delaware to pursue a
business opportunity in an expanding market, such as Colorado.57  Fi-
nally, some tramp corporations did business on a national or interna-
tional scale.  They incorporated in a state in which they were not
headquartered and their operations were widespread in many states.
Jurisdiction based on domicile could not be effective over a foreign
corporation, even a pseudo-foreign corporation, because a corpora-
52. See Schollenberger, 96 U.S at 376–78; see also St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882);
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722; William F. Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and Individ-
uals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676, 689–90 (1917).
53. Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 137 (1955) (apparently
the first use of the term).
54. Chiappinelli, supra note 3, at 788 n.29.
55. E.g., Kimball v. Davis, 52 Mo. App. 194, 213 (1892) (apparently the first use of the term in
print, though the opinion, written by distinguished corporate scholar, law journal editor, and
judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals Seymour D. Thompson, suggests that the appellation
was well known).
56. See, e.g., Troy & N.C. Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 92 S.E. 494, 495 (N.C. 1917).
57. See, e.g., Wootton Land & Fuel Co. v. Ownbey, 265 F. 91, 92 (8th Cir. 1920).
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tion was domiciled only in its state of incorporation, regardless of
where its headquarters was.58  A foreign corporation could consent to
personal jurisdiction, as an individual could.59  Since in many circum-
stances a state had the power to exclude foreign corporations, states
often conditioned doing business on the foreign corporation’s register-
ing with the state and designating an in-state agent for service of pro-
cess.  These statutes also frequently provided for consent to personal
jurisdiction, often construed as general jurisdiction.60
Frequently, though, a corporation would have dealings in a foreign
state without being registered in that state.61  The corporation might
not have registered because it believed it was engaged wholly in inter-
state commerce, in which case the states were without power to ex-
clude foreign corporations.62  The corporation might also have
believed that its dealings with the other state were insufficient to meet
the state’s statute requiring registration.  More strategically, the cor-
poration might have purposefully failed to register simply to compli-
cate or narrow any subsequent litigation.  A corporation’s foreign
registration might open it up to general jurisdiction, while not register-
ing would only result in specific jurisdiction.63  Finally, the corpora-
tion’s failure to register might have been a mere oversight.
In such cases personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
could be predicated on four theories; one was implied consent.  The
foreign corporation’s consent to jurisdiction was implied from the fact
that it took actions within the forum state.64  A second theory, prima-
rily advanced by scholars, predicated personal jurisdiction on the fair-
ness of subjecting foreign corporations to jurisdiction for acts
58. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355 (1882).
59. Scott, supra note 43, at 879.
60. See Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 94–96 (1917); see
also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855); Cahill, supra note 52, at
689–90. See generally Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting Re-
gistration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1 (1990).
61. Scott, supra note 43, at 880 (“Not infrequently it happens that a foreign corporation does
business in a state without having filed consent to any form of service . . . .”).
62. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 182–83 (1868).  But note that even in those
instances states could require a foreign corporation to appoint an in-state agent for service of
process. See Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1914).
63. Compare Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 243 U.S. 93 (scope of consent via registration broadly con-
strued), with Simon v. S. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 116–17, 132 (1915), and Smolik v. Phila. &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). See also Charles W. “Rocky”
Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64
FLA. L. REV. 387, 394 n.33 (2012).
64. Lafayette Ins. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 408–09; see also Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 22 (1907); Scott, supra note 43, at 880–83.
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performed in the forum state.65  This theory was occasionally found in
legal opinions.  Judges Learned Hand and Benjamin Cardozo both es-
poused it,66 and it was adopted sub silentio in International Shoe.67
But until International Shoe, the theory was not widely regarded as
viable.
Typically, however, personal jurisdiction was based on the third and
fourth theories, which were closely related.  In one, jurisdiction was
said to attach when the foreign corporation was “present” in the juris-
diction.68  This approach was intellectually consonant with Pennoyer’s
focus on territoriality.69  Frequently “presence” was made to turn on
whether the corporation was “doing business” within the forum
state.70  The concept of “doing business” sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction spawned a rather large commentary.71
The related theory predicated jurisdiction simply on “doing busi-
ness.”  This theory was based either on a truncated logic that doing
business was the proper test for presence,72 a belief that doing busi-
ness was required to meet due process,73 or, on a nonconstitutional
level, an interpretation of the state’s amenability statute.74
65. See, e.g., Calvert Magruder & Roger S. Foster, Jurisdiction Over Partnerships, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 793 (1924); Scott, supra note 43; Note, What Constitutes Doing Business by a Foreign Cor-
poration for Purposes of Jurisdiction, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 187 (1929).
66. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (opinion of L. Hand, J.);
Smolik, 222 F. 148 (opinion of L. Hand, J.); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y.
1917) (opinion of Cardozo, J.); Bagdon v. Phil. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075 (N.Y.
1916) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
67. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945).
68. Cahill, supra note 52, at 678; see also Note, supra note 65, at 188.
69. See Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898).
70. Scott, supra note 43, at 881–82.
71. See generally, e.g., F. Arnold Daum, The Transaction of Business Within a State by a Non-
Resident as a Foundation for Jurisdiction, 19 IOWA L. REV. 421 (1934); Elcanon Isaacs, An Anal-
ysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1925); Note, supra note 65.
72. Scott, supra note 43, at 881–82.
73. Note, supra note 65, at 187 (“[I]t is a fundamental requisite under the Constitution that
the corporation shall be ‘doing business’ in the state or district where the service is made to
sustain [service of process’s] validity.”).
74. See Cahill, supra note 52, at 695.  During this period very few states also adopted amena-
bility statutes covering foreign corporations in lawsuits arising out of their actions within the
state. See Edward W. Cleary & Arthur R. Seder, Jr., Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illi-
nois Courts, 50 NW. U. L. REV. 599, 604 (1955).  Note that these statutes are distinct from the
nearly universal statutes requiring a foreign corporation doing business within the state to regis-
ter and consent to jurisdiction.  These statutes were, in part, declaratory of the judicial holdings
basing personal jurisdiction on either implied consent or presence via doing business, but at least
one arguably went further, covering in-state torts, even if the corporation were not doing busi-
ness within the state.  The validity of none of these statutes was, apparently, litigated before
International Shoe and it is difficult to know whether they had any effect. Id. at 604.
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As early as 1916, clarifying the theory of personal jurisdiction over
foreign corporations was perceived as a chronic and important issue.75
By the end of the 1920s this was perceived as a major issue and was
the subject of much academic analysis.76 International Shoe, itself,
went to the Supreme Court on the question of whether the company’s
activities in Washington state were sufficient to constitute “doing
business.”77
Personal jurisdiction would not have been especially troublesome in
the simplest tramp corporation setting: a local business incorporated
out of state.  Typically, stockholder suits against such corporations
could easily have been brought in the state in which the corporation
actually operated.  Because the corporation was always intended to do
business in the forum state, it probably registered to do business there
and so had appointed an agent upon whom service of process could be
made.  If it had not registered, personal jurisdiction over the corpora-
tion could nonetheless be invoked under theories of implied consent,
fairness, or, more likely, presence through doing business.  The direc-
tors and officers of such a corporation were very likely to be domi-
ciled in the forum state or at the very least to be frequently present in
the forum state to attend to the corporation’s business.  Service of
process over those individuals could, in the normal case, be effected
without difficulty.
Where the tramp corporation’s operations were intended to be re-
mote from the corporate headquarters, a stockholder might have con-
siderable difficulty obtaining personal jurisdiction in one forum over
both the corporation and the fiduciaries.  The corporation would be
amenable only in states where it did business and in its state of incor-
poration.  The presence of officers or directors was considered irrele-
vant to whether the corporation itself was present.78  Thus, service of
process within the jurisdiction on such a person was ineffective to con-
fer jurisdiction over the corporation if the corporation were not other-
wise present.  The promoters were likely to be amenable to process,
75. Cahill, supra note 52, at 676.
76. See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 71; Note, When is a Foreign Corporation “Doing Business”
Within the State?, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 362 (1921); Note, supra note 65.
77. Statement as to Jurisdiction at 20–24, Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
(No. 107) (noting two questions presented by the case: whether company’s actions in Washing-
ton constituted “doing business” and whether Washington’s unemployment tax unduly burdened
interstate commerce.); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 65 S. Ct. 1579 (noting probable
jurisdiction and stating that “[t]he Court does not care to hear argument on the question
whether the statutes attacked placed an undue burden on interstate commerce”).
78. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1915); see also
Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406, 411 (1903); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S.
518, 521 (1895).
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however, only where they lived or worked.  If the promoters were
careful to avoid traveling to the state in which the corporation’s oper-
ations were actually located, there might be no forum in which the
case could be brought.
In the case of a truly national tramp corporation, the corporation
might be amenable in many states, but again the directors would only
be amenable to personal jurisdiction in their state of domicile or wher-
ever they could be found.  If they routinely worked in a state other
than that in which they lived, such as directors who worked in New
York City but lived in Connecticut or New Jersey, then they might, as
a practical matter, be liable to service in both states.  Otherwise, ser-
vice was possible only if the plaintiff knew the fiduciary were to be
traveling to a state in which the plaintiff wished to bring suit and could
arrange for personal service within that state.
The state of incorporation was not likely to be a viable or even pref-
erable venue for stockholder litigation over these local tramp corpora-
tions.  Personal jurisdiction over the corporation was, of course,
assured, but was not substantially more certain or easier to effect than
in the corporation’s headquarters state.  But the state of incorporation
was likely to have no personal jurisdiction over the individual defend-
ants.  They were not domiciled there, nor was there any reason con-
nected with the corporation for them to be in the state.  This was
especially true for tramp corporations incorporated in less populous
states such as Delaware, West Virginia, Maryland, South Dakota, or
Maine, all of which had sizeable numbers of pseudo-domestic corpo-
rations.79  For these corporations, then, stockholder litigation was, as a
practical matter, confined to the state in which the corporation actu-
ally operated.
As a practical matter, the feasibility of stockholder litigation turned
on whether the corporation could be made a party in the state or
states in which the directors lived or worked.  A plaintiff’s lawyer
would logically start by assessing where the most directors, or those
with the deepest pockets, could be served and then would assess
whether the corporation could be served in that same forum.
79. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–1929, 49 J. ECON.
HIST. 677, 685 (1989); see also Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corpo-
rate Charters and the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 361 n.226,
365 n.251, 366 (2007).
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C. New York’s Personal Jurisdiction Advantage Makes It the
Center of Stockholder Litigation
By 1920 Delaware was the leader in pseudo-domestic incorpora-
tions.80  Yet stockholder litigation was not centered in Delaware.
Rather, modern stockholder lawsuits were much more likely to be
brought in Manhattan than in Wilmington.  Moreover, the important
caselaw regarding stockholder litigation was being developed by the
New York state courts, not the Delaware courts.81  New York was the
center of stockholder litigation because it was the most certain forum
in which to secure personal jurisdiction over both directors and
corporations.
In all likelihood, directors of public companies, if not also officers,
were likely to reside or work in a financial center, because they were
likely to need to be close to investment bankers, leading entrepre-
neurs, and one another.  Also, because they typically did not tend to
the daily management of the corporation, they had no need to live
near the corporation’s operational center.
That meant that the directors, particularly those perceived to have
deep pockets, were usually subject to personal jurisdiction in New
York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, or Illinois.82  It seems
likely that many directors who lived in New Jersey or Connecticut
would either work in New York or at least be frequently present to
attend to business there.  Although many corporations doing business
in New York might not have registered there, they might be found to
be present or to be doing business there for purposes of personal
jurisdiction.
80. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 206 n.18 (1933) (“Of the whole list [of the 573 NYSE actively traded listed
companies in 1928], 148 of the 573 corporations hold Delaware charters, most of them relatively
recent; New York is second with 121, most of them relatively old; New Jersey third with 87, most
of which grow [sic] out of the great merger period from 1898–1910.”); see also JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1780–1970, at 148 (1970).
81. See, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917); Bagdon v. Phil. &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916); Pollitz v. Gould, 94 N.E. 1088 (N.Y. 1911).
Much federal litigation also involved stockholder litigation. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930); Smolik v. Phil. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
82. See Hornstein, Legal Controls, supra note 30, at 405 n.5 (“The necessity of effecting ser-
vice within the jurisdictional limits of the court upon both the corporation and the defendant
directors has proved responsible for the prosecution of so many of these suits in New York City,
where there is a pronounced concentration of directors.”); see also Winer, supra note 33, at 153
(“The directors and officers of large corporations are likely to be located in New York or Chi-
cago, where the corporation cannot be found.”).
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Regardless of the actual incidence of stockholder litigation, it is
clear that New York was the most important forum state.  As early as
1924, at the start of the age of modern stockholder litigation, a thor-
ough academic discussion of stockholder litigation in the Yale Law
Journal cited more than 150 cases from more than 30 different courts.
More than one-third of those cases were decided by the New York
state courts.  U.S. Supreme Court cases were a distant second with
14%.83  This initial dominance reinforced, and was reinforced by, a
robust and concentrated plaintiffs’ bar in New York City.  A study in
the 1940s found that over half of the substantial stockholder suits
brought in New York were filed by 14 firms.84  New York’s dominance
continued into the late 1940s.  A standard deskbook on corporate law
cited 166 cases in its chapter on stockholder litigation, of which 29%
were from New York state courts.85
More stockholder litigation might have been filed in Delaware, or
at least not been heard in New York, had a procedural doctrine not
declined in vigor just as modern stockholder litigation was evolving.
Earlier in the twentieth century, many state courts dismissed stock-
holder litigation involving foreign corporations on the ground of fo-
rum non conveniens.  Even then, they sometimes adjudicated
stockholder litigation when the foreign corporation’s headquarters
were located in the forum state.  That is, courts sometimes decided
cases involving pseudo-foreign corporations.  But by the late 1920s,
just as modern stockholder litigation was emerging as a force in corpo-
rate law, courts deemphasized the forum non conveniens doctrine in
corporate cases and routinely decided foreign corporation cases.86
Most importantly, courts would hear such suits that alleged fraud or
83. See Glenn, supra note 26.  New Jersey (8%) and Maine (5%) were the only states with 5%
or more. Only one case out of the 156 was decided by a Delaware state court.
84. FRANKLIN S. WOOD, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF N.Y., SURVEY AND RE-
PORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 57 (1944).
85. See ROBERT S. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 783–837
(2d ed. 1949).  United States Supreme Court cases and cases from Maryland were tied for a
distant second (8% each).  Three of the 166 cases (<2%) were decided by a Delaware state
court.
86. See Note, Internal Regulation of Foreign Corporations, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 968, 969
(1929).  Courts did tend to dismiss cases seeking dissolution or appointment of a receiver for a
foreign corporation, issuing or cancelling stock, and cases requiring a ruling on a stockholder or
board meeting or the election or removal of directors. Id. at 971–72, 975–76.  Courts would
entertain stockholder actions involving foreign corporations where the suit sought an accounting
or alleged an ultra vires act. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 144–45 (1933)
(Stone, J., dissenting); see also Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-
American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 & n.104 (1929); Joseph Dainow, The Inappropriate
Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867 (1935); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the “Internal Affairs” of a
Foreign Corporation, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 492 (1933).
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wrongdoing by the foreign corporation’s fiduciaries, even though lia-
bility turned on interpreting and applying the state of incorporation’s
corporation law.87  Thus the New York courts could and did routinely
hear stockholder litigation involving Delaware corporations.  The ex-
perienced plaintiffs’ bar in New York sought to litigate there because
New York provided the best chance for personal jurisdiction over
both the corporation and the most important directors.  Further, the
leading cases in that corporate law area were New York cases.
III. STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION SHIFTS TO DELAWARE
A. New York Becomes Antagonistic to Stockholder Litigation
Between the passage of the Securities Act of 1934 and the early
1940s, the number of derivative suits brought in New York increased
substantially.88  As might be expected, those who were on the receiv-
ing end of such lawsuits were not particularly pleased by that in-
crease.89  Accordingly, a series of legislative and judicial procedural
initiatives during the 1940s resulted in stockholder litigation becoming
decentered in New York.
First, in the spring of 1941, the New York legislature explicitly gave
corporations the power to indemnify directors.90  Although not di-
rectly intended to curb stockholder litigation, the legislation was seen
as favoring directors at the expense of the stockholders because the
fiduciaries’ expenses were paid from corporate funds, which would
have otherwise been available for settlement or general corporate
purposes.91
New York’s other procedural changes were specifically directed at
curtailing stockholder litigation.92  The statute of limitations in deriva-
tive actions was shortened from ten years to six in 1942.93  Perhaps
more potently, the statute eliminated the equitable doctrine of tolling,
87. Note, supra note 86, at 972–73, 975.
88. WOOD, supra note 84, at 32.
89. Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders’ Derivative Suits: 23 Years’ Experience, 4
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 50, 52 (1968).
90. The legislature did so in two overlapping and uncoordinated statutes. See Act of April 2,
1941, ch. 209, 1941 N.Y. Laws 813; Act of April 14, 1941, ch. 350, 1941 N.Y. Laws 1034.  These
statutes were reconciled by Act of April 18, 1945, ch. 869, 1945 N.Y. Laws 1971. See George D.
Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1947) [herein-
after Hornstein, New Aspects].  The intent of the statutes was to overturn the result in N.Y. Dock
Co. v. McCollum, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
91. Hornstein, New Aspects, supra note 90, at 8–10.
92. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 732 n.80.
93. Act of May 15, 1942, ch. 851, 1942 N.Y. Laws 1873.
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thus making the statute effectively a statute of repose.94  At first
blush, this change would not seem to work a hardship because even a
six-year statute of limitations would seem luxurious in terms of filing a
suit for corporate wrongdoing.  However, many corporate fiduciaries
were apparently able to conceal their questionable actions for years.95
In fact, even under the ten-year statute of limitations with tolling,
some stockholder suits had been defeated on statute of limitations
grounds.96
The third and fourth initiatives were adopted as companion pieces
of legislation in 1944, although one was far more controversial than
the other.97  The less controversial, though probably more impor-
tant,98 change was the adoption of a contemporaneous ownership rule,
which limited the number of potential plaintiffs and increased the
plaintiffs’ bar’s burden of finding a representative plaintiff.99   The
more controversial act gave the corporation the option to seek secur-
ity for expenses in certain derivative litigation.100  That is, the corpora-
tion, typically controlled by the fiduciary defendants, could require
the plaintiff in a derivative action to post a bond at any stage in the
proceeding.  The bond was to be sufficient to cover “the reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees, which may be incurred by” all the
defendants, including, of course, the corporate fiduciaries.101  Moder-
ate defense costs of such a suit in New York in the mid-1940s were
estimated to be equivalent to about $1,300,000 today.102  This measure
was undoubtedly intended to discourage all but the strongest deriva-
tive lawsuits.
94. See George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in New York,
32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 126 n.9 (1944) [hereinafter Hornstein, Death Knell] (noting that the
statute of limitations was reduced from ten years to six and ran from the fraudulent action, not
from its discovery).
95. For example, Hauben v. Morris involved challenged actions that occurred seven years
before the complaint, Hauben v. Morris, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (App. Div. 1938), aff’d, 22 N.E.2d
482 (N.Y. 1939), and Turner v. American Metal Co. revolved around actions that took place
twenty years prior to suit.  Turner v. Am. Metal Co., 36 N.Y.S.2d 356, 385 (Sup. Ct. 1942), rev’d,
50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (App. Div. 1944) (trial court held suit viable against one defendant because the
statute was tolled, though others dismissed on statute of limitations grounds).
96. Hornstein, New Aspects, supra note 90, at 8.
97. See Se´rgei S. Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the Constitutionality of Section 61-b of
the New York General Corporation Law, 54 YALE L.J. 352, 353 n.7 (1945).
98. See Ralph M. Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 CORNELL
L.Q. 431, 458 (1944).
99. Act of April 9, 1944, ch. 667, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1454.
100. Act of April 9, 1944, ch. 668, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1455.
101. Id.
102. See Hornstein, Death Knell, supra note 94, at 124 ($100,000 in 1944); see also CPI Infla-
tion Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2014) ($100,000 in 1944 equivalent to $1,333,982.95 in 2014)
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The statute exempted stockholders who held 5% or more of the
corporation’s stock or who held stock with a market value of more
than $50,000, which is equivalent to more than $650,000 today.103  As
contemporaneous commentators pointed out, in the public company
setting, the $50,000 limitation was the practical one; 5% of a publicly
traded company would certainly be worth much more than $50,000.104
The security-for-expenses statute was harshly criticized at the time of
adoption both for its substance and for the stealth process by which it
was enacted.105   The cumulative effect of these procedural changes
was stark.  Derivative actions in New York City against large corpora-
tions, which had been averaging over fifty per year between the mid-
1930s and the mid-1940s, fell by 96% to two per year thereafter.106
B. The Federal Courts Briefly Attract Stockholder Litigation
Perhaps the most obvious venue for stockholder litigation, given the
procedural developments in New York, was the federal courts.107  But
two procedural aspects of federal litigation made the federal courts
less attractive than New York courts to stockholder litigation plain-
tiffs’ lawyers.108  First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required
court approval of any derivative litigation settlement, which put a
damper on collusive or sweetheart settlements.109  New York, by con-
trast, failed to exercise any significant judicial oversight of stockholder
litigation settlements until 1961.110  Further, because in New York
only the named parties were bound until a final judgment, private set-
103. CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 102 ($50,000 in 1944 equivalent to $666,991.48 in
2014).
104. Hornstein, Death Knell, supra note 94, at 124.
105. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 815–17; see also Hornstein, Death Knell, supra note 94, at
123–24; Zlinkoff, supra note 97, at 353–54.  Lawrence Mitchell has persuasively argued that anti-
Semitism played a large role in the statute’s adoption. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Gen-
tleman’s Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation, 36
QUEEN’S L.J. 71 (2010).
106. Hornstein, New Aspects, supra note 90, at 5, 12–13.
107. See Carson, supra note 98, at 459.
108. At least two procedural approaches important to stockholder litigation were essentially
the same in the federal court as in New York and other principal states and thus did not make a
difference to plaintiffs’ counsel in deciding where to file suit.  First, the federal system had a
contemporaneous ownership requirement since Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See
Additional Rule of Practice in Equity 94, 104 U.S. ix (1882) (current version at FED. R. CIV. P.
23.1(b)(1)).  Second, state law security-for-expenses statutes were binding on the federal courts
in those states and thus did not provide any advantage.  Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (1939) (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c)).
110. Business Corporation Law, ch. 855, § 626(d), 1961 N.Y. Laws 2356, 2404 (codified at
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 2012)) (adding section 626 to the Business Corpora-
tions Law, which required, in subsection (d), judicial approval of derivative action settlements).
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tlements were frequent.111  The difference between New York and
federal practice in this regard tended to keep stockholder litigation in
New York state courts.112
Second, the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the federal
courts cut against centering stockholder litigation there.  Until the
mid-1960s, federal stockholder litigation was based on diversity of citi-
zenship.  Because of the complete diversity rule, every named plaintiff
had to be a citizen of a different state from every defendant.113  Be-
cause so many individual defendants were citizens of New York, New
Jersey, or Connecticut, plaintiffs residing in any of those states de-
feated diversity jurisdiction.114  Thus the New York plaintiffs’ bar
found it more difficult to find plaintiffs of diverse citizenship because
of the lack of easily accessible information about stockholders and the
limitations on lawyer solicitation of clients.115  Paradoxically, then, the
strong likelihood of personal jurisdiction over all indispensable parties
in New York, the very factor that made New York the center of corpo-
rate litigation, cut against federal litigation.
Nonetheless, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the federal
courts were centers for stockholders asserting what were essentially
corporate law claims.116  Three principal developments led to this flo-
rescence.117  First, the SEC held that stockholders could characterize
at least some breaches of corporate law fiduciary duties in market
transactions as SEC Rule 10b-5 claims.118  Second, in 1964 the Su-
preme Court held that stockholders could recover damages under the
New York had considered, and rejected, such a provision in 1942.  Hornstein, Death Knell, supra
note 94, at 136.
111. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 822–30.
112. George D. Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder’s Derivative Suits, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 574, 591 (1942).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).
114. Until 1958, corporations were considered citizens only of the state of incorporation. See
13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3624, at 41 (3d ed.
2009).
115. See Hornstein, New Aspects, supra note 90, at 13.
116. The federal courts during this period also saw an explosion of stockholder litigation
based on traditional interpretations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  These cases did not necessarily federalize state
corporation law claims for relief.  For that reason, the rise of strictly federal securities litigation is
not directly relevant to the question of centering for stockholder derivative litigation.
117. On the rise and fall of federal stockholder litigation during this period, see Richard A.
Booth, The Fall and Rise of Federal Corporation Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161 (2007); Brian
Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427; Mark J. Loewenstein, A Perspective on Federal Corporation Law, 2 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 425 (2007); Michael A. Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution: No Harm, No
Foul?, BRIEFLY. . ., May 2008, at 1.
118. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
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federal securities law for fundamental corporate transactions such as
mergers.119  These two changes meant that stockholders could litigate
in federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, thus avoiding
problems of demonstrating complete diversity.120
Finally, the Court amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in
1966 to make class actions opt-out, which increased the preclusive ef-
fect of derivative actions.  Before 1966, derivative actions were “opt
in,” binding only those stockholders who affirmatively requested to be
included; in reality the rule provided only for permissive joinder.  By
binding all stockholders, the amendments increased the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff class and, by extension, the attor-
ney’s fees for plaintiffs’ counsel, which created an incentive to litigate
in federal court.121
These changes resulted in a concentration of stockholder litigation
in the federal courts beginning around 1965.122  But a decade later,
over the course of just twenty months, the Supreme Court made fed-
eral stockholder litigation distinctly inhospitable to plaintiffs.  In June
1975 the Court imposed a more restrictive test for implying private
rights of action and also restricted standing under the securities laws
to those who actually purchased or sold securities.123  Less than a year
later, the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder held that plaintiffs in
Rule 10b-5 actions had to show that defendants intended to defraud
them.124  Ten months after Ernst & Ernst, the Court in Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green effectively shunted much stockholder litigation to
the state courts by holding that claims for fiduciary duty violation, di-
vorced from any allegation of deception, could not be brought under
Rule 10b-5.125
119. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
120. See Note, supra note 89, at 59–61 (detailing successful efforts to transform stockholder
litigation based on state corporate law into federal securities suits).
121. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
39 F.R.D. 69, 94–107 (1966).  On the effect of the amendments for stockholder derivative suits,
see Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP, Plaintiffs’ Perspective, in LITIGATING SECURI-
TIES CLASS ACTIONS § 1.01 (Jonathan N. Eisenberg ed., 2011) (detailing the history of securities
class actions).
122. See Cheffins et al., supra note 117, at 444; see also Perino, supra note 117, at 11–13
(describing the rise of federal securities litigation starting in the mid-1960s).
123. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 753–54 (1975).
124. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
125. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977); cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471 (1979) (holding that federal courts would look to state law to determine whether a special
litigation committee was independent, even when litigating a federal securities claim, which gave
plaintiffs no substantive advantage to litigating securities claims in federal court).
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C. Delaware’s Personal Jurisdiction Advantage Makes It the
Center of Stockholder Litigation
1. Institutions
After New York affirmatively discouraged stockholder litigation,
Delaware had the institutional and doctrinal elements necessary to be
the new center of stockholder litigation.  The institutional elements
that made Delaware the center of stockholder litigation were largely
in place by 1950.  The lynchpin of Delaware’s success in becoming the
center of stockholder litigation was its procedure.  Specifically, Dela-
ware’s sequestration system of personal jurisdiction and the theory on
which it was based were unique to Delaware and could not readily be
copied by other states.
The earliest institution contributing to Delaware’s emergence as the
center of litigation, a Court of Chancery presided over by a Chancel-
lor, was in existence by 1800.126  Although not intended at the time, a
separate court of equity and a judge whose jurisdiction was wholly
equitable led to the speedy decisions and subject matter expertise that
are highly prized, at least ex ante, by corporate litigants and their law-
yers.  Courts of equity became the exclusive venue for stockholder
derivative actions on the theory that a court of law would not recog-
nize the power of a stockholder to control the corporation; that power
was vested in the board.127  Moreover, the Delaware General Assem-
bly occasionally added to the Chancellor’s jurisdiction in corporate
matters by statutorily granting the power to resolve certain intra-cor-
porate disputes that might not otherwise have fallen within his juris-
diction.128  In 1939 the position of Vice Chancellor was created, which
further institutionalized the previously ad hominem nature of Dela-
ware equity.129  A second Vice Chancellor position was created in
1961.130
A second necessary institution was essentially in place by 1900.  The
General Corporation Law (DGCL) of 1899131 was not primarily
126. DEL. CONST. OF 1792, art. VI, §§ 1, 14.  Delaware had courts of chancery before the
American Revolution but no separate judicial officer administering them.  Rather, it appears
that the same judges heard cases in both law and equity. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 13; see
also William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 825 (1993).
127. This approach was developed in the mid-nineteenth century and was firmly in place by
1882. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1882).
128. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 126, at 834.
129. See id. at 846–48.
130. Act of Mar. 2, 1961, ch. 5, § 1, 53 Del. Laws 7, 7.
131. General Corporation Law, ch. 273, 21 Del. Laws 445 (1899)
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wrought by Delaware lawyers or even with Delaware in mind. Rather,
it was adopted wholesale, with some modest changes thought to be
improvements, from New Jersey’s corporation law of 1896.132  The
DGCL was perceived as effective (whether for good or for ill) for
corporate managers from 1899 onward and has never been considered
to be significantly outdated or inappropriate for public corpora-
tions.133  Since its adoption, the statute has undergone only three ma-
jor retoolings:134 almost immediately after adoption,135 in the late
1920s just before the Crash,136 and in 1967.137  The 1967 revision en-
tailed a thorough review of the existing substantive provisions, and the
final product was thought to be a state-of-the-art modern corporation
statute for public corporations.138
The third institution important to Delaware’s success, a large body
of caselaw, was also, and rather surprisingly, in place by 1900.  The
surprising part is that such a body of decisions could be put in place
within a year of the statute’s adoption.  However, Chancellor Nichol-
son held, in accord with a traditional maxim of statutory interpreta-
tion, that by adopting New Jersey’s corporation statute largely
verbatim, the Delaware General Assembly intended that the statute
be interpreted in accord with New Jersey caselaw.139  In one stroke,
nearly twenty-five years of relevant corporate law decisions were im-
mediately imported into Delaware and grafted onto the DGCL.140
132. Yablon, supra note 79, at 359–60; see also Grandy, supra note 79, at 685; William E. Kirk
III, A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: How Delaware Used the Federal-State System to
Attain Corporate Pre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233, 251–54 (1984); Harwell Wells, The Moderni-
zation of Corporation Law, 1920–1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 618 (2009). See generally LIN-
COLN STEFFENS, THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 209–294 (1906).
133. See Yablon, supra note 79, at 361 (“In short, Delaware’s proponents sought to present
their law as a better, cheaper version of New Jersey.”).
134. See S. Samuel Arsht, A History of the Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1,
9–11 (1976).  In 1953, the DGCL was rearranged and reorganized as part of a recodification of
all Delaware statutes, but the substance was not significantly changed. Id. at 11 n.69.  For a
harsh critique of Arsht’s interpretation of the DGCL, but one that does not take issue with his
periodization, see Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of
1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249 (1976).
135. Act of Mar. 7, 1901, ch. 166, 22 Del. Laws 255.
136. Act of Mar. 2, 1927, ch. 85, 35 Del. Laws 220; Act of Mar. 22, 1929, ch. 135, 36 Del. Laws
366.  On the importance of those amendments, see A.A. Berle, Jr., Investors and the Revised
Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1929).
137. Act of July 3, 1967, ch. 50, 56 Del. Laws 151.
138. On the drafting process of the 1967 statute, see Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the
Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 863–72 (1969).
139. Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. People’s Ry. Co., 47 A. 245, 251–53 (Del. Ch. 1900).
140. Yablon, supra note 79, at 361.  Many key provisions of New Jersey’s corporations code
were in place by 1875, so the relevant New Jersey case law spanned 25 years by 1900. Id. at
333–34, 340–45, 349–50.
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That importation comprised a considerable body of precedent.141  Of
course, the Delaware Court of Chancery immediately built upon that
body of precedent.  In terms of importance if not quantity, the Court
of Chancery entertained major corporate litigation from the 1910s
onward.142
The final institutional component important to Delaware’s success
is its corporate bar.143  According to an influential Delaware plaintiff’s
lawyer, by the late 1960s, the Delaware corporate bar was about
twenty-five lawyers, which was only 5% of the total number of Dela-
ware lawyers in private practice.144  The corporate work was concen-
trated in three firms on the defendant side.145  On the plaintiffs’ side,
the Delaware bar was likewise a “small coterie” of lawyers.146  The
point is that the Delaware corporate bar, whether specializing in non-
litigation work on behalf corporations or litigation for plaintiffs or de-
fendants, was relatively distinct and actively engaged in furthering
Delaware’s position as the leader in pseudo-domestic
incorporations.147
2. Legal Rules
In addition to the institutional elements of Delaware’s success, the
substance of Delaware’s corporate law played a significant role, but
not one that gave it advantages that other states could not replicate.
In modern management parlance, most of Delaware corporate law
has been “best practices” but not “sustainable advantages.”  That is,
most of Delaware corporate law has been necessary to keep Delaware
in the lead, but has not given Delaware any special advantage that
could not be replicated by other states.148
141. A Westlaw search reveals that between 1875 and 1899 New Jersey had 322 reported cases
involving corporate law; Delaware had 22.
142. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 126, at 841.
143. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 692 (1974); see also Comment, supra note 138, at 864.
144. Comment, supra note 138, at 863–64 (citing Interview with Irving Morris, Esq., in Wil-
mington, Del. (July 25, 1968)); cf. Cary, supra note 143, at 692.
145. Comment, supra note 138, at 864.
146. Cheffins et al., supra note 117, at 463; see also Mary Williams, Delaware’s Sedate Chan-
cery Court Is a Major Corporate Battleground, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1984, at 37 (“A core of
about two dozen lawyers work the court.”).
147. Comment, supra note 138, at 863–64; see also Cary, supra note 143, at 668, 687–92; Ehud
Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1908, 1939–40 (1998).
148. See Kamar, supra note 147, at 1933.
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Other states could, and did, adopt Delaware’s corporate statute
more or less whole.149  At least a handful of states currently base their
corporations statute on Delaware’s.150  Indeed, as we have seen, Dela-
ware itself initially took its corporations statute from another state.
This New Jersey/Delaware corporations law might be thought of as
being an urtext for corporate statutes.  To the extent that revisions,
large or small, in the ur-statute might give a state an advantage for
awhile, other states could copy those provisions when they seem to be
valuable or necessary.  Delaware’s substantive decisional law might
also be imported, as Delaware did with New Jersey’s decisions.  But,
as Ehud Kamar points out, that may no longer be the advantage it was
in 1900.151  If nothing else, the equitable nature of many corporate law
issues means that it is the judges as well as the decisions that matter.
Unless other states clone the Court of Chancery jurists, adopting Del-
aware caselaw is probably not a sustainable advantage.152
That leaves procedural law qualities with the potential to give Dela-
ware a unique, sustainable advantage over other states.  In general,
Delaware’s procedure was not less hospitable to stockholder plaintiffs
than procedures in other states.153  In two areas it was significantly
more welcoming.  However, those two aspects could have been dupli-
149. New Jersey kept the structure of its act, with some amendments, intact from 1875 until its
own 1968 revision. Statement of the Honorable Richard J. Hughes, Governor of the State of New
Jersey, in Introduction to the Symposium of the Rutgers Law Review Examining “The New Jersey
Business Corporation Act,” 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 613, 613 (1968); see also Comment, supra note
138, at 892.  Thus for more than 60 years, New Jersey and Delaware had comparable corpora-
tions statutes.  Ironically, New Jersey revised its corporations statute at the same time Delaware
did, and in part to adopt Delaware innovations, but paradoxically, New Jersey essentially
adopted the Model Business Corporations Act structure.  Cain v. Merck & Co., 1 A.3d 834, 839
& n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010); see also Comment, supra note 138, at 892; Patrick J.
Ryan, Book Review, 48 BUS. LAW. 1745, 1745 (1993).
150. At least four U.S. jurisdictions currently do so.  Michael P. Dooley & Michael D.
Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737, 738 & n.4 (2001) (listing Kansas, Nevada,
Oklahoma, and Puerto Rico).
151. Kamar, supra note 147, at 1929–30.
152. Id.; see also Ryan, supra note 149, at 1745–46 (noting that New Jersey courts have not
had the corporate law case flow that Delaware or New York has had, thus necessitating sophisti-
cated treatises).
153. Delaware imposed a contemporaneous ownership rule on plaintiffs in 1945.  Act of April
18, 1945, ch. 157, § 4, 45 Del. Laws 594, 598 (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 327 (2013)); see also Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 110–11 (Del. Ch. 1948).
By the late 1940s, other important commercial states—including Maryland, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania—had such a requirement.  Hornstein, New Aspects, supra note 90, at 7
& n.36.  The federal courts had such a rule since the 1890s. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1881); see also Additional Rule of Practice in Equity 94, 104 U.S. ix (1882) (current version at
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)).
Delaware’s demand requirement, which had been in place since 1911, also paralleled that of
other states and the federal courts. See Ellis v. Penn Beef Co., 80 A. 666, 668 (Del. Ch. 1911); see
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cated by other states and thus were not sustainable advantages in the
competition for caseflow.
Delaware’s lack of a security-for-expenses statute made Delaware a
distinctly more favorable jurisdiction in which to litigate than other
states, especially New York.154  Abe Pomerantz, a leading plaintiffs’
lawyer of the time, believed it to be advantageous to sue in a state
without a security-for-expenses statute and noted that Delaware was
the favored jurisdiction in that regard.155  By the late 1960s, at least
ten states had such statutes, including California, Florida, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, and those statutes were
binding on the federal courts in those states.156  Of course, any of
these states could have duplicated Delaware’s approach simply by re-
pealing their statutes.  If the absence of a security-for-expenses statute
were an advantage in attracting stockholder litigation, it was one
every state could possess.
Delaware’s other procedural advantage was its approach to stock-
holder inspection rights.  Delaware’s attitude was probably inadver-
tent, but nonetheless was inviting to the plaintiff’s bar.157  Delaware,
like virtually every other state, had codified the common law right of
stockholders to inspect corporate records.158  In the 1967 revision pro-
cess, Irving Morris, the only plaintiff’s bar member of the revision
committee, persuaded the committee to continue to permit inspection
without percentage or temporal ownership restrictions, which were in-
creasingly common in other states.159  He also convinced the commit-
tee to place the power to grant inspection in the Court of Chancery,
eliminating a cumbersome Superior Court mandamus process.160
also ERNEST L. FOLK III, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 99 (1968) (noting the
Delaware rule accords with that of other states).
Finally, Delaware developed a common law rule that permitted the Chancellor to approve a
settlement of a stockholder derivative suit. See, e.g., Karasik v. Pac. E. Corp., 180 A. 604 (Del.
Ch. 1935).  Approval became mandatory in 1948. See Mayer v. Adams, 133 A.2d 138, 140 (Del.
Ch. 1957).  Other states had developed a similar approach by the mid-1960s. FOLK III, supra, at
109 (listing eighteen states that had a similar rule to Delaware); see also Hornstein, New Aspects,
supra note 90, at 20.
154. Comment, supra note 138, at 888.
155. Note, supra note 89, at 61 (citing Interview with Abraham L. Pomerantz, Attorney, in
N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 15, 1967)).
156. FOLK III, supra note 153, at 109; see also Hornstein, New Aspects, supra note 90, at 5–6
(listing Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949) (holding state security-for-expenses statutes to be substantive for Erie purposes).
157. See Comment, supra note 138, at 887–88.
158. FOLK III, supra note 153, at 165–68.
159. See Comment, supra note 138, at 887–88; see also FOLK III, supra note 153, at 165–68.
160. Comment, supra note 138, at 887–88; see also Memorandum from Irving Morris to Mem-
bers of the Del. Corp. Law Revision Comm’n (Oct. 1, 1964), available at http://law.widener.edu/
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With this change, plaintiffs had a streamlined method with fewer
procedural hurdles to obtain corporate records that might reveal fidu-
ciary duty breaches.161  Although this change was a definite advan-
tage, it appears that only Morris realized just how attractive this
would make Delaware in the eyes of the plaintiffs’ bar.162  But again,
as with the security-for-expenses statutes, any state could have
adopted Delaware’s approach.
3. Sequestration
Delaware’s unique and inimitable system of personal jurisdiction
was the key to Delaware becoming and remaining the center of stock-
holder litigation.  From 1927 onward, Delaware had a method for ob-
taining personal jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries that other
states could not replicate: sequestration.  When New York ceased to
be the center of stockholder litigation and the federalization of stock-
holder claims ended, Delaware used sequestration to attract lawsuits
and become the center of stockholder litigation.
Sequestration depended upon three elements.  First, a Delaware
statute declared that all shares of stock in Delaware corporations are
located in Delaware.  Second, Delaware adopted an amenability stat-
ute that asserted quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over nonresident fiduciaries
by seizing their stock to induce them to enter a general appearance.
Third, stock was seized by notifying the corporation’s Delaware agent,
not by seizing the certificate.
As for the first principle, Delaware’s 1899 statute provided that the
stock of a Delaware corporation was located in Delaware.163  Consti-
tutionally, this provision is important because, under Pennoyer v. Neff,
a state has power over property located within its borders.164  Locat-
ing shares of all Delaware corporations in Delaware lets the state ad-
judicate quasi-in-rem actions that are entitled to full faith and
credit.165
LawLibrary/Research/OnlineResources/DelawareResources/~/media/Files/lawlibrary/corpora-
tions/committeedocuments.ashx.
161. See Cary, supra note 143, at 688; see also Comment, supra note 138, at 887–88.
162. See Comment, supra note 138, at 887–88.
163. General Corporation Law, ch. 273, § 128, 21 Del. Laws 445, 499 (1899) (codified as
amended at DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (2013)) (“For all purposes of title, action, attachment,
garnishment taxation and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, the situs of the ownership of
the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State. . . shall be regarded as
in this State.”).
164. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
165. See id. at 733–34.
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The second principle, that personal jurisdiction over nonresident fi-
duciaries could be effected by seizing their Delaware stock, builds on
the first principle and was put in place in 1927.  In response to a deci-
sion of the Chancellor that he had no power to assert personal juris-
diction over nonresidents by seizing their stock,166 the General
Assembly enacted section 366, which became known as the sequestra-
tion statute.167  It gave the Court of Chancery the power to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by seizing the
defendant’s Delaware property, including shares of stock.  The court
could sell the property to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim unless the defen-
dant made a general appearance.168
Third, section 366 did not set out the procedure to be followed to
seize the shares, leaving that power to the Chancellor.169  The Chan-
cellor’s practice, eventually embodied in a rule, required that the
plaintiff by affidavit assert, among other things, that the defendant
owned stock in a particular Delaware corporation.  The Chancellor
then appointed a sequestrator who served a notice of seizure on the
corporation’s in-state agent. The notice directed the agent to identify
to the sequestrator any shares held by the defendant and to reflect on
the corporation’s records that the shares in question were seized by
the sequestrator.170  Essentially, the sequestration procedure seized
shares by providing notice to the corporation’s in-state agent.
This “notice rule” for seizing stock was the nearly uniform approach
in the early twentieth century.171  However, by the early 1930s many
states had adopted a different approach.  The Uniform Stock Transfer
Act provided that stock could only be seized by physical capture of
the certificate itself.172  This “certificate rule” was intended to facili-
tate a national market in securities by protecting purchasers.  A bona
fide purchaser of stock could be assured of good title if he or she re-
ceived the certificate endorsed by the registered holder.  Under the
166. Skinner v. Educ. Pictures Sec. Corp., 129 A. 857, 860–61 (Del. Ch. 1925).
167. Act of Apr. 12, 1927, ch. 217, 35 Del. Laws 613 (1927) (codified as amended at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (2013)); see also Wightman v. S.F. Bay Toll-Bridge Co., 142 A. 783, 784
(Del. Ch. 1928) (“The new provisions were enacted in order to obviate the effect of [Skinner].”
(citation omitted)).
168. Act of Apr. 12, 1927 § 1, 35 Del. Laws at 614 (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 366(a)).
169. Id. (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(b)) (“The Chancellor shall
have power to make all necessary rules respecting the form of process, the manner of issuance
and return thereof . . . .”).
170. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 4(db); see also Greene v. Johnston, 99 A.2d 627, 629 (Del. 1953).
171. See Joseph Henry Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a
Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 107, 111 (1913).
172. UNIF. STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 13, 6 U.L.A. 17 (1922) (withdrawn 1951).
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notice rule, the rights of such a purchaser might be subordinated to
the rights of a person who had seized the shares by notice to the
corporation.173
Given a choice between protecting purchasers while facilitating se-
curities markets on the one hand and protecting plaintiffs while facili-
tating personal jurisdiction over stockholders on the other, most states
obviously would have chosen the former and thus adopted the certifi-
cate rule.  For Delaware, however, the notice rule made more sense.
Obviously, Delaware had (and has) very few residents; thus protecting
purchasers of securities would have been a lower priority vis-a`-vis fa-
cilitating personal jurisdiction for stockholder litigation.  For Dela-
ware, the sequestration procedure was a brilliant development.
The notice rule, coupled with Delaware’s lead in pseudo-domestic
corporations, created an advantage for stockholder litigation that
other states could not duplicate.  Even states such as New York that
presumably had a large number of stock certificates within their bor-
ders could not have duplicated Delaware’s advantage, because certifi-
cates are so mobile and most owners keep their certificates safe from
physical seizure.  Thus plaintiffs in stockholder litigation would, as a
practical matter, be unable to effect personal jurisdiction over corpo-
rate fiduciaries by quasi-in-rem jurisdiction through seizing the fiduci-
aries’ stock certificates.  To have an advantage in securing personal
jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries, quasi-in-rem seizures need to
operate under the notice rule.  Only Delaware’s sequestration ap-
proach, which located stock in Delaware and retained the notice rule,
coupled with the large percentage of pseudo-domestic corporations,
could provide this advantage.
By the early 1960s, Delaware was one of the few states that retained
the notice rule.  More importantly, Delaware was the only state that
both retained the notice rule and had a significant number of pseudo-
domestic corporations.  Other commercially important states, includ-
ing California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Illi-
nois, Michigan, and Ohio, had switched to the certificate rule by the
early 1960s.174  By the early 1970s, Delaware was unique in retaining
the notice rule.175
173. See id. § 13 commissioners’ note, 6 U.L.A. at 18; see also U.C.C. § 8-317 cmt. (1951)
(current version at U.C.C. § 8-112 (2012)).
174. See Robert P. Smith, Jr., Note, Levy and Attachment of Corporate Stock, 10 U. FLA. L.
REV. 209, 212 n.8, 212–15 (1957) (providing detailed description of state approaches); see also
FOLK III, supra note 153, at 264 (noting that California had impliedly repealed its sequestration
approach in favor of a certificate approach).
175. Pierre R. Loiseaux, Liability of Corporate Shares to Legal Process, 1972 DUKE L.J. 947,
959–61.
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By the mid-1960s, Delaware was undoubtedly the most popular
state for stockholder litigation.  More importantly, it was widely be-
lieved that Delaware’s primary advantage in attracting cases was its
sequestration procedure.  One former Delaware Chief Justice
remembered that derivative litigation in Delaware was the “big thing”
when he first came to the bar in 1963.176  Even by the mid- to late-
1950s, Delaware litigation was prominent.  As another former Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court noted, “I served a summer
‘clerkship’ at Sullivan and Cromwell in New York in 1956, when al-
most all cases I worked on were in Delaware.”177  Two prominent
plaintiffs’ lawyers of the 1960s believed that by 1968 Delaware had
become the most attractive alternative to New York.178  Likewise, de-
fendants’ lawyers also preferred Delaware by the mid-1960s.179
Practitioners and academics in the 1960s and 1970s recognized that
the centering of stockholder litigation in Delaware was in large part
caused by sequestration and that changing sequestration might have
truly disastrous consequences for Delaware caseflow.  Former Chief
Justice Moore observed that, in the mid-1960s, stockholder litigation
“provided a very comfortable living for both the plaintiffs’ and the
defendants’ bar and educated a great many children.”180  Professor
Folk also thought sequestration was key to Delaware caseflow.181  The
thoughtful and well-informed student-author of the famous Law for
Sale Comment also believed that sequestration was key to centering
stockholder litigation in Delaware.182  Certainly the Delaware lawyers
who revised the DGCL in the 1960s believed sequestration was vital
to Delaware’s success.  Both a leading plaintiffs’ attorney and a prom-
inent defendants’ attorney were of the view that sequestration was
key to retaining stockholder litigation.183  But Delaware’s position as
176. Andrew G.T. Moore II, Shareholder Rights Still Alive and Well in Delaware: The Deriva-
tive Suit: A Death Greatly Exaggerated, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 947, 954 (1994).
177. E. Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV.
163, 164 (2004).
178. Note, supra note 89, at 61–62 (quoting Abraham L. Pomerantz and Sidney B. Silverman).
179. Minutes of Thirty-Second Meeting of Delaware Corporation Law Study Committee 2
(Apr. 15, 1966), available at http://law.widener.edu/LawLibrary/Research/OnlineResources/De-
lawareResources/~/media/Files/lawlibrary/corporations/committeeminutes.ashx (reflecting that
numerous members of the New York defendants’ bar “felt Delaware was a more favorable fo-
rum than any other available”).
180. Moore II, supra note 176, at 954.
181. FOLK III, supra note 153, at 265; see also Ernest L. Folk III & Peter F. Moyer, Sequestra-
tion in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 795–96 (1973).
182. Comment, supra note 138, at 890. The author became a distinguished antitrust scholar,
Professor Harry First, of N.Y.U. School of Law.
183. Minutes of Thirty-Third Meeting of Delaware Corporation Law Study Committee 1–2
(Apr. 25, 1966), available at http://law.widener.edu/LawLibrary/Research/OnlineResources/De-
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the center of stockholder litigation was not as secure as it appeared.
Within a few years Delaware’s unique advantage would be struck
down.
D. Shaffer v. Heitner Ends Delaware’s Unassailable Advantage184
Delaware’s sequestration process, the lynchpin of its success in
stockholder litigation, was struck down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Shaffer v. Heitner, which held that sequestration vio-
lated the Due Process Clause because it did not comport with the min-
imum contacts test of International Shoe. 185  Delaware had been the
center of state stockholder litigation since the mid-1960s and no doubt
eagerly anticipated the effects on the Court of Chancery’s docket of
the Supreme Court’s decisions that relegated much federal stock-
holder litigation to state courts.  But that eager anticipation must have
turned to dread when, on the first Monday in October 1976, the Court
noted probable jurisdiction in Shaffer.186  The paradox was that three
months after the Court put the final nail in the coffin for federal stock-
holder suits based on state corporate law claims, it destroyed Dela-
ware’s primary tool for hearing those suits.187 Shaffer arose when the
Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and its California
subsidiary violated the antitrust laws, resulting in a judgment and fines
of over $13.5 million.188  Arnold Heitner, a Greyhound stockholder,
filed a derivative suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, naming the
corporation and twenty-eight nonresident directors and officers.189
lawareResources/~/media/Files/lawlibrary/corporations/committeeminutes.ashx (Irving Morris,
plaintiffs’ lawyer, opining that amending the sequestration statute would send corporate litiga-
tion to other states); see also id. at 3 (S. Samuel Arsht, defendants’ lawyer, expressing similar
support for sequestration).
184. The best description of the events leading up to Shaffer is Wendy Collins Perdue, The
Story of Shaffer: Allocating Jurisdictional Authority Among the States, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
STORIES 129 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).  As Professor David L. Ratner noted, “Although
the Supreme Court had quite a bit to say on the subject in its Shaffer opinion, what it said is not
very clear.”  David L. Ratner & Donald E. Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the
Substantive Law of Corporations, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 641, 645 (1979).
185. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945)
186. Shaffer v. Heitner, 429 U.S. 813 (1976).
187. See Richard J. Agnich et al., What Business Will Look for in Corporate Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 6, 30 (2000) (Justice Jack Jacobs observing that Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), resulted in “a complete reallocation of the
corporate law dispute business from the federal to the state courts.  A further result . . . of that
decision was that the Delaware Court of Chancery became one of the most active corporate law
courts in the country . . . .”).
188. Complaint at 4–7, Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 188 (Del. Ch. 1975)
(No. 4514).
189. Id. at 1–4.
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The plaintiff’s Delaware counsel obtained an order of sequestration
against twenty-one of the defendants, seizing over $1.5 million worth
of stock.190
The individual defendants challenged the sequestration system on
three grounds.  First, the defendants reasoned that because the
avowed purpose of sequestration was to compel a general appearance,
the sequestration procedure was really an action in personam and
must meet the requirements of International Shoe.  Second, they as-
serted that section 169, the situs statute, was ineffective to locate the
Greyhound stock in Delaware and that therefore there was no prop-
erty within Delaware to be seized.  Only seizure of the certificates
would be effective.  Finally, they argued that the sequestration process
violated the pre-and post-seizure safeguards required by recent Su-
preme Court cases.191  As would be expected, both the Court of Chan-
cery and the Delaware Supreme Court rejected all of these
arguments.192
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States was largely
unanimous in its view, although the Court’s analysis had little to do
with the due process mechanics of the Delaware sequestration system
actually raised by the parties.  Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court, observed that International Shoe was pivotal in refocusing the
in personam inquiry away from territorial presence to whether the de-
fendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state such that asserting
personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.193  But no comparable concepts had yet
undercut Pennoyer’s territoriality principle in cases where the dispute
involved in rem or quasi-in-rem rather than in personam jurisdic-
tion.194  Justice Marshall then concluded, “We think that the time is
ripe to consider whether the standard of . . . International Shoe should
be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.”195
190. Heitner, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 188, 193–94, aff’d, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), rev’d sub nom.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186.  The affidavit in connection with the sequestration asserts the defendants
owned 101,753 shares of Greyhound stock and that the closing price was $15.25 per share, for a
total of $1,551,733. See Affidavit Pursuant to Rules 4(da) and 4(db), Heitner, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L.
188 (No. 4514).  Apparently seven defendants did not own Greyhound shares and so were not
amenable to the sequestration statute. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 n.8.
191. Heitner, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 192–98.  In particular, the defendants contended that se-
questration violated the teachings of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
192. Heitner, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 188, aff’d, 361 A.2d 225.
193. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 203–04.
194. Id. at 205.
195. Id. at 206.
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He decided that it did.  Prudence might have suggested that the
Court remand the case to the Delaware court system either to dismiss
the action or for further proceedings if the plaintiff could show mini-
mum contacts.  Some of the Justices favored this approach.196  But in
the end, the Court assessed the minimum contacts question for a vari-
ety of reasons, including a belief that the parties had, in fact, ad-
dressed the minimum contacts factual question; probable
embarrassment at issuing an opinion that sidestepped the question
presented; and, at least for Justice Powell, the perceived unfairness of
subjecting the defendants to continued litigation (the shares had been
sequestered for over three years by the time the Supreme Court is-
sued its opinion).197
In a gigantic leap of logic, Justice Marshall assumed in a footnote
that, if minimum contacts existed, Delaware’s sequestration statute
and rule would be sufficient to make the defendants amenable in this
case.198  Even a cursory reading would reveal that no such amenability
was stated or intended by Delaware, and Justice White’s questions at
oral argument made clear that Delaware’s view was that without se-
questration the defendants were not amenable to personal jurisdic-
tion.199  Justice Brennan rightly took Justice Marshall to task for this
approach.200
In any event, undeterred by the state of the record or the text of
Delaware law, the Court moved ahead to reject the plaintiff’s sugges-
tion that Delaware’s interest in overseeing domestic corporations was
a sufficient contact.  Justice Marshall correctly held that a state’s inter-
est for choice of law purposes is not sufficient for personal jurisdiction
purposes.201  Likewise, Justice Marshall dismissed plaintiff’s argument
that serving as a director vel non is a sufficient contact, even with the
benefits that the plaintiff noted in his brief (i.e., the possibility of in-
demnification and of interest-free loans).  Rather, that interest is,
196. See Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 18,
1977); Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 18, 1977).  These
letters are available at http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer03.pdf.
197. See Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 18,1977);
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 31, 1977); Letter
from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Thurgood A. Marshall (May 31, 1977).  These letters
are available at http://civprostories.law.cornell.edu/chap03/shaffer04.pdf.
198. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213 n.40.
199. See Oral Argument at 52:20–56:10, Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 (No. 75-1812), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_1812/argument.
200. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 219–21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. at 213–15 (majority opinion).
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again, sufficient for choice of law purposes but not personal jurisdic-
tion purposes.202
So it was that Delaware’s unassailable advantage in personal juris-
diction was declared unconstitutional.  Because Delaware had no gen-
eral long-arm statute nor a specific amenability statute for fiduciaries,
Shaffer left Delaware with no method at all of asserting personal juris-
diction over nonresident fiduciaries.  The First State was in danger of
being last.
IV. DELAWARE’S DIRECTOR CONSENT STATUTE KEEPS
STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION CENTERED IN DELAWARE
UNTIL THE 1990S
A. Delaware Adopts a Director Amenability Statute and Remains
the Center of Stockholder Litigation
Within two weeks after Shaffer, Delaware approved the current
method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over directors: a director
amenability statute, section 3114, ostensibly predicated upon implied
consent.203  Given that broad long-arm statutes had been adopted in
many other states for a decade or more,204 one might think that the
easiest and most efficacious solution was either a broad long-arm stat-
ute or a statute targeted at directors and based on the director’s mini-
mum contacts rather than his or her fictitious “implied” consent.  In
fact, a year after section 3114 was enacted Delaware adopted a broad
long-arm statute.205  But like every other state, it has consistently
found that nonresident directors’ actions do not fall within any of the
provisions.206
Delaware’s reliance on implied consent is puzzling in light of the
fact that when section 3114 was adopted the Supreme Court of the
202. Id. at 215–17.
203. Act of July 7, 1977, ch. 119, 61 Del. Laws 328 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114
(2013)); see also Chiappinelli, supra note 3, at 797–98.  The statute was later expanded to include
officers because fewer officers also served as directors after Sarbanes-Oxley.  Act of June 30,
2003, ch. 83, § 3, 74 Del. Laws 213, 213 (codified at DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b)).
204. See AM. LAW.  INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 376 nn.2–3 (1968) (listing, as of May 1965, Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin).
205. Act of July 11, 1978, ch. 471, 61 Del. Laws 1328 (codified as amended at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 3104).
206. Chiappinelli, supra note 3, at 805–09; cf. Keith H. Beyler, The Illinois Long Arm Statute:
Background, Meaning, and Needed Repairs, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 293, 423–24 (1988).  Professors
Kahan and Kamar “are unaware of cases upholding the exercise of jurisdiction over a director of
a domestic corporation where the state lacked a specific statute authorizing such jurisdiction and
the director did not have other contacts with the state.”  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 714
n.118.
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United States had rejected personal jurisdiction based on implied con-
sent for half a century.207  Several motivations suggest themselves for
Delaware’s choice of implied consent.  Probably the strongest is that
the Delaware drafters had grave concerns that any long-arm statute,
rooted as it must be in minimum contacts, would fail to bring in non-
resident directors because ordinarily they would not, in fact, have suf-
ficient contacts with Delaware.208  Despite the obvious constitutional
problems with section 3114, the Delaware Supreme Court quickly up-
held it against due process challenges.209
What no one could have predicted in 1977 was that a new wave of
merger and acquisition activity would begin and would be character-
ized by, among other things, increased litigiousness.210  A former
Chancellor and Delaware Supreme Court Justice called it a “litigation
barrage” “largely caused by the takeover wars” of the 1980s.211  Like-
wise, Professors Armour, Black, and Cheffins, who have written the
most detailed analyses of Delaware stockholder litigation, report that
“[c]orporate litigation surged [in Delaware] in the 1980s,” primarily
because of an increase in M&A and LBO activity.212
In addition to the well-known flood of Chancery litigation during
the 1980s mergers and acquisitions wave, a significant amount of Del-
aware stockholder litigation in the 1980s was generated because the
Delaware Supreme Court decided three cases that greatly unsettled
Delaware corporate procedure.  First, and ultimately least important,
the court decided in late 1977 that a majority stockholder could not
effect a merger for the sole purpose of eliminating the ownership in-
terests of the minority; the majority must show another “business pur-
pose” for the merger.213  Obviously, this Singer test made second-step
mergers more difficult.  Much litigation ensued both to define the bus-
iness purpose test and to establish whether that test had been met in a
particular merger.  The Singer test lasted only five-and-a-half years,
but saw fifty reported decisions.
Second, the court in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado provided an ave-
nue for corporate management to dismiss fiduciary duty litigation, but
only after the Court of Chancery had conducted a fact-intensive inves-
207. Chiappinelli, supra note 3, at 812–14.
208. Id. at 814–15.
209. See Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980).
210. See Cheffins et al., supra note 117, at 450–52; see also Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and
the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211, 224 (2007).
211. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 126, at 860.
212. Cheffins et al., supra note 117, at 450–51.
213. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979–80 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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tigation into the bona fides of the managers who recommended dis-
missing the litigation.214 Zapata did not lead to more cases being filed,
but it did lead to more litigation activity in those cases and to more
reported opinions as the Chancery court members struggled to reach a
consensus on Zapata’s requirements.215
Finally, and most importantly, in 1984 the Delaware Supreme Court
put teeth into the demand requirement for derivative litigation.216
The demand requirement had been part of Delaware law since 1911,
but since at least the 1920s it had been merely a pro forma require-
ment.  It was sufficient to allege in the complaint that demand was
excused because the directors themselves were the defendants.217  But
in Aronson v. Lewis the court held that the Court of Chancery was no
longer to accept these allegations on their face, but rather was to con-
duct its own inquiry into whether the directors were disinterested and
independent and whether the challenged transaction was the product
of business judgment before deciding whether demand on the board
was excused as futile.218
The combined effect of these changes was to intensify the litigation
in the Delaware Court of Chancery.  Within a decade of Aronson,
over one-hundred Court of Chancery opinions had been filed dealing
with Zapata, Aronson’s demand futility test, or both.219  While on the
surface one might think this would have been viewed with favor by
the Delaware bench and bar, the reality was that the plaintiffs’ bar in
other states, which typically spearheaded stockholder litigation,
viewed these developments as overtly hostile to their interests and
therefore made Delaware less attractive to the plaintiffs’ bar.220  As
the author of Aronson himself noted, after Zapata and Aronson,
[S]ome members of the plaintiffs’ bar began decrying the death of
the derivative action.
. . . The prerequisite that shareholders submit particularized
pleadings to sustain a finding of demand futility was viewed by some
in the plaintiffs’ bar as insurmountable.  What really caused alarm,
with some justification, is the fact that a claim of demand futility
214. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1981).
215. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 126, at 860 (observing that Zapata required the trial
court to determine three new fact-intensive inquiries: (1) how long should the action be stayed
while the committee investigates, (2) how much discovery should plaintiff be allowed into the
committee’s activities, and (3) an assessment of the committee’s substantive decision).
216. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
217. Moore II, supra note 176, at 956 (citing Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414
(Del. Ch. 1924)).
218. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
219. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 126, at 860–62.
220. Moore II, supra note 176, at 956–57.
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must survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss without the benefit
of discovery.221
B. Delaware Believes It Is Losing Cases
At the turn of the twenty-first century Delaware still appeared to be
the center of stockholder litigation.222  One detailed study shows that
in 1999 and 2000, roughly half of all stockholder lawsuits involving
acquisition transactions were filed in the Court of Chancery with the
remainder scattered in other state and federal courts.223  But for as
long as fifteen years before the millennium at least some leaders of
the plaintiffs’ bar were unhappy litigating in Delaware.224  According
to the most detailed study, beginning in the late 1990s, stockholder
litigation began to flow out of Delaware, typically to courts in corpo-
rate headquarters states.225  Some litigation also flowed into the fed-
eral courts.226  This trend became more pronounced from about 2002
onward.227  The upshot, according to these scholars, is that Delaware
corporations faced more stockholder litigation, especially in mergers
transactions.228  Further, they were more likely to have those suits
filed in multiple fora.229
The reasons for this decline in Delaware’s hegemony are the subject
of some considerable speculation.  For our purposes, it matters less
what the actual causes are as it does what the Delaware judiciary and
bar believes the causes to be.  It is Delaware’s reaction to the changes
that is important.  The leading academics, whose work is closely fol-
lowed by the Delaware judiciary, suggest five causes: public state-
221. Id. at 957 (footnote omitted).
222. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1750, 1760 (2004). But see Jessica Erickson, Corporate Gov-
ernance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1762–63
(2010) (“The federal courts are now the center of a significant percentage of corporate
litigation . . . .”).
223. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Jurisdictional Effects in M & A Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LE-
GAL STUD. 132, 140 tbl.1, 140–44 (2014).
224. Cheffins et al., supra note 117, at 452; see also Moore II, supra note 176, at 957.
225. Armour et al., Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 607; cf. Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving
Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 299, 305 (2008). But see Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1–2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2285485 (suggesting that cases are not flowing out of Delaware but rather more transactions are
subject to multiforum litigation).
226. Erickson, supra note 222, at 1762, 1763.
227. Armour et al., Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 607; see also Krishnan et al., supra note 223,
at 133.
228. Armour et al., Losing Cases, supra note 6, at 642.
229. Id.; see also Cain & Davidoff, supra note 10, at 3; Myers, supra note 225 (manuscript at
1–2).
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ments by Delaware judges that are critical of the plaintiffs’ bar and
the suits they file; Delaware judges’ award of attorney fees that the
plaintiffs’ bar considers too low, especially since 2005;230 Delaware
judges’ ceasing to select the attorneys of the first filed case as lead
counsel; Delaware judges’ reluctance to order expedited discovery
compared to judges in other jurisdictions; and a fragmentation in the
plaintiffs’ bar that encouraged multiforum litigation as a means for
smaller, less established plaintiffs’ firms to have a chance to be named
lead counsel.231  Regardless of the actual extent of this decline, there
seems to be a perception among academics that “Delaware no longer
dominates” stockholder litigation.232
The Delaware bar has its own theories for the rise of multiforum
litigation.  One experienced plaintiffs’ counsel has named the follow-
ing factors as important causes of the exodus from Delaware: the high
standard for obtaining expedited discovery in Delaware; the Delaware
judges’ custom of refusing to hear a motion for preliminary injunction
until the corporation has made its proxy disclosures to stockholders;
the Delaware judges’ custom of denying a preliminary injunction in
M&A transactions in which only one bidder appears; the lack of juries
in the Court of Chancery; and the sense that non-Delaware courts will
be more amenable to appointing the filer as lead plaintiff and lead
counsel.233  An equally experienced defendants’ counsel ascribed the
following as causes: the plaintiffs’ bar’s belief that non-Delaware
judges may be more likely to interpret Delaware corporate law more
favorably to plaintiffs; the lack of jury trials in the Court of Chancery;
the lack of punitive damages in the Court of Chancery; and the belief
that non-Delaware judges may be more likely to award higher attor-
ney’s fees.234
Losing caseflow would be damaging to Delaware for several rea-
sons.  First, it might allow another state to supplant Delaware as the
center of stockholder litigation.235  Another downside is that losing
230. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 8–9 (tracing the origin of plaintiffs’ bar’s dissatisfac-
tion with Delaware fee awards to then-Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion in In re Cox Communi-
cations, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
231. Armour et al., Balancing Act, supra note 6, at 1380; see also Cheffins et al., supra note
117, at 429–30.
232. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 6, at 4.
233. Stuart M. Grant, Managing Dir., Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., Remarks at Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law Symposium: The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change and Continuity,
Panel: Delaware’s World: Who Are Its Competitors? (Nov. 11, 2011), in 2012 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 640, 668–670.
234. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 6–9.
235. See Roe, supra note 10, at 131 (contending that to compete with Delaware, a state would
“need a flow of cases to work with[] to be at the top of their game”).
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cases “would dilute the distinctiveness of Delaware corporate law, and
erode the value of Delaware’s chartering business.”236  Some academ-
ics believe that caseflow helps a state to attract and retain pseudo-
domestic incorporations.237
Aside from a competition model of caseflow, Delaware and other
states may take a more qualitative or high-road view.  Continued
caseflow allows judges to “build expertise and prominence and further
buttress their state’s stature and attractiveness.”238  Caseflow, particu-
larly the cumulative effect of many case holdings, is “central to the
value of Delaware’s corporate law franchise.”239
Not only do academics see the danger to Delaware from diminished
caseflow; the Court of Chancery judges do, too.  Vice Chancellor Par-
sons believes that the volume of cases in the Court of Chancery “ac-
celerate[s] the development of refined doctrine, measured balance,
and valuable predictability.  In short, with repeat experience comes
ready expertise and real efficiency.”240  Vice Chancellor Laster, too,
has indicated that caseflow leads to better caselaw.241  Finally, former
Chancellor Strine has expounded at length on why caseflow in Dela-
ware both serves investors’ expectations and helps to develop valuable
authoritative corporate law precedent.242
V. DELAWARE’S PROCEDURAL RESPONSES
A. Delaware’s Efforts to Attract and Coerce Stockholder Litigation
Beginning in the fall of 2010, the judges of the Court of Chancery
began publicly to discuss their dissatisfaction with non-Delaware
stockholder litigation,243 although there were a few earlier indications
that they were becoming aware of the phenomenon.244  They did so at
first, as they frequently do, through transcript rulings, which Chief Jus-
tice Strine has called “the new samizdat literature” of corporate
law.245
236. Stevelman, supra note 4, at 62.
237. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 10, at 7.
238. Id.
239. Quinn, supra note 7, at 832.
240. Parsons, Jr. & Tyler, supra note 2, at 478.
241. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 29 & n.127 (collecting statements).
242. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 2, at 55–60.
243. Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 25 & n.106 (collecting statements).
244. See id. at 25 n.108.
245. Transcript of Rulings of the Court from Oral Argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction at 6, In re NYSE Euronext S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 8136-CS (Del. Ch. May
10, 2013).
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The Court of Chancery then began to take actions to ensure that
Delaware remains the center of stockholder litigation.  It has taken at
least seven steps to entice or coerce litigation to take place in Dela-
ware.  Missing in all of these reactions, though, is any attempt to ad-
dress the question of personal jurisdiction.  Simply put, Delaware has
underappreciated the importance of personal jurisdiction to its
success.246
The most widely noted move was then-Chancellor Strine’s award of
$304 million in attorney’s fees in a stockholder derivative suit.247  That
award represented 15% of the total judgment, and was over $35,000
per hour for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.248  This result was seen as a signal
to the plaintiffs’ bar that Delaware was going to be more generous to
plaintiffs’ attorneys, at least in genuinely successful cases, than it had
been in the recent past.249
But changing the plaintiffs’ bar’s perception of Delaware’s recep-
tiveness to stockholder litigation is only part of Delaware’s solution.
Even though the plaintiffs’ bar might remain either hostile to filing
voluntarily in Delaware or at least hostile to filing voluntarily only in
Delaware, the Court of Chancery has nonetheless attempted to coerce
plaintiffs by enlisting the help of corporate managers.  Perhaps the
earliest such attempt was Vice Chancellor Laster’s suggestion to
pseudo-domestic corporations that they include forum selection
clauses in their certificates of incorporation.250  Thus stockholders
would, by purchasing stock, agree to litigate intra-corporate disputes
in Delaware to the exclusion of other fora.  The ostensible rationale
for corporate managers is that multiforum litigation entails additional
246. Academics, too, have generally ignored personal jurisdiction as a factor in Delaware’s
success, though Professor Coyle has perceptively surfaced the issue.  Coyle, supra note 6, at
1954, 1970. See also Kahan & Kamar, supra note 7, at 714 & n.118.
247. Revised Final Order and Judgment, In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 52
A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011) (C.A. No. 961-CS), aff’d sub nom. Am. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51
A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
248. Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff’s Petition for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and
Expenses and Rulings of the Court at 78–79, In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 52
A.3d 761 (No. 961-CS).
249. Alison Frankel, Record $285 Ml Fee Award Is Strine’s Message to Plaintiffs’ Bar,
REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2011, 2:57 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/12/21/record-
285-ml-fee-award-is-strines-message-to-plaintiffs-bar/.  Vice Chancellor Laster, when in private
practice, also suggested an enticement to the plaintiffs’ bar to sue in Delaware.  He suggested
that Delaware repeal the contemporaneous ownership requirement.  Doing so would make Del-
aware a more hospitable state for stockholder litigation because plaintiffs’ counsel would not
face the stricture of identifying a stockholder who had owned stock at the time of the alleged
wrong.  He candidly acknowledged that it is plaintiffs’ counsel that drives stockholder litigation
and noted that in some instances, suits have been allowed to continue without a named plaintiff.
Laster, supra note 25, at 692–93.
250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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corporate costs that exceed any benefits to the stockholders.251  Then-
Chancellor Strine later went a step further and validated such clauses
even when adopted only by the board, in the bylaws, without a stock-
holder vote.252  Vice Chancellor Laster also endorsed that
approach.253
The first court to consider such a bylaw, however, invalidated it.  A
board-adopted bylaw of a Delaware corporation was struck down by a
federal court in California on the ground that a bylaw adopted only by
the board, which was adopted after the wrongdoing complained of by
the plaintiffs and adopted by board members who were named de-
fendants, cannot bind stockholders, at least those who were stockhold-
ers before the bylaw was adopted.254  Further, one knowledgeable
corporate lawyer and academic in California has suggested that Cali-
fornia may not honor forum selection clauses that require suit in the
Delaware Court of Chancery because that court’s lack of juries would
run afoul of a provision of the California constitution.255  More gener-
ally, the Delaware courts have acknowledged that at least questions of
comity militate toward having the issue of enforceability considered in
the first instance by the non-contracted-for forum.256  A decision by
that court, of course, implicates full faith and credit questions.  None-
theless, the Court of Chancery judges have decided enforceability is-
sues in advance of a decision by the non-contracted-for forum, and
they have indicated that they may continue to do so.257
The Court of Chancery has also explored the possibility that it
could effectively eliminate multiforum litigation.  This would not pre-
vent stockholder litigation from being filed exclusively outside Dela-
ware, but rather would make litigation filed in Delaware and
251. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 944 & n.31 (Del. Ch.
2013) (collecting sources).
252. Id. at 954–58.  Note that these clauses are typically a one-way street; they bind stockhold-
ers but not the corporation itself.  A study of stockholder litigation in 1999–2000 showed that
target corporations in M&A deals that chose to file suit (only 5 companies) all chose to file in
their headquarters state rather than in Delaware, presumably to gain the benefits of hometown
affinity.  Krishnan et al., supra note 223, at 143 tbl.2, 144.
253. Transcript of Telephonic Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motions for Expedited Proceedings and
for Temporary Restraining Order and Rulings of the Court at 30, Edgen Grp. Inc. v. Genoud,
C.A. No. 9055-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013).
254. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
255. Keith Paul Bishop, Forum Selection Bylaws—Why a California Court May Not Follow
Delaware, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (June 27, 2013), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2013/06/forum-se-
lection-bylaws-why-a-california-court-may-not-follow-delaware/.
256. Transcript of Telephonic Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motions for Expedited Proceedings and
for Temporary Restraining Order and Rulings of the Court, supra note 253, at 38–42.
257. Id.; see also Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938 (Del.
Ch. 2013).
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elsewhere subject to heightened control in the Delaware Court of
Chancery.  Vice Chancellor Laster sent a warning in 2010 to both the
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bars that Delaware would not sit idly by
and let parallel litigation in other states usurp what Delaware consid-
ered its rightful power to approve settlements in multiforum stock-
holder litigation.258  The dynamic the Vice Chancellor was concerned
about was so-called reverse auction litigation in which the defendants
welcome multiforum litigation because they can then negotiate with
plaintiffs in each jurisdiction for the best (i.e., quickest or cheapest)
settlement, obtain approval from the relevant court, and then dismiss
the other litigation under the full faith and credit clause.259  While the
Court of Chancery took no action against any parties or their counsel,
the point was surely not lost on those constituencies that Delaware
judges would be carefully watching to ensure that Delaware’s role was
not diminished by reverse auctions.260
In a related attempt to ensure that Delaware retained control over
multiforum stockholder litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster refused to
accord a California federal judgment full faith and credit on the
grounds that the named plaintiffs in the California actions were differ-
ent from those in the Delaware suit and were not in privity with each
other.  Thus the California judgment was not entitled to preclusive
effect.261  Further, he found that the California plaintiffs were inade-
quate representatives of the stockholders generally and therefore
could not bind the plaintiffs and stockholders in the Delaware ac-
tion.262  The Delaware Supreme Court reversed both holdings, but the
attempt illustrates the aggressiveness with which the Court of Chan-
cery judges are attacking this problem.
The Delaware judges have also attempted to convince judges in
other states to allow Delaware to proceed with multiforum stock-
holder litigation.  Since at least 2009, the Court of Chancery judges
have looked with favor, if not actively encouraged, defense counsel to
file a motion simultaneously in the Court of Chancery and in the other
courts in which similar litigation is pending.  The motion prays for the
litigation to proceed in only one jurisdiction and is ostensibly neutral
258. See Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 15, at 16–31.
259. Brief of Special Counsel at 2–5, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc., C.A. No.
5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2011).
260. See id.; see also Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference, supra note 15, at 16–31;
Letter from Hon. J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor, Del. Court of Chancery, to counsel in Scully
v. Nighthawk Radiology Holdings, Inc. (Apr. 12, 2011) (on file with author).
261. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 334–35 (Del. Ch. 2012), rev’d, 74
A.3d 612 (Del. 2013).
262. Id. at 335.
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as to which jurisdiction is the active one.  The motion requests that the
judges in each court confer among themselves and decide which court
is the most appropriate to handle the case.263
Although the conversations among the judges are confidential, pre-
sumably the Delaware judges marshal arguments that the case should
proceed in Delaware because Delaware substantive law will apply,
that the Delaware judges are well versed in that law and in resolving
high-stakes stockholder litigation, and that the Delaware courts are
capable of resolving such cases quickly and with finality.  Surprising
and frustrating as it may be to Delaware, these motions do not always
produce a consensus that Delaware is the most appropriate forum.264
Chief Justice Strine, like Vice Chancellor Laster, has attempted to
corral multiforum stockholder litigation in Delaware by changing pro-
cedural rules.  He would effect this by modifying the forum non con-
veniens factors a court should consider.  In stockholder litigation,
Chief Justice Strine would make the primary consideration the choice
of law to be applied.265  Because of the internal affairs doctrine, of
course, that means that a court outside of Delaware should decline to
hear stockholder litigation involving a Delaware pseudo-domestic cor-
poration while the Delaware Court of Chancery should retain
jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Strine would also eliminate the presumption that the
first filed lawsuit takes priority over subsequently filed actions.
Rather, which action should proceed typically ought to be, again, the
action filed in the state of incorporation because that best represents
the putative preference of the corporation’s stockholders who indi-
rectly indicate that preference when they purchase stock.266  The ra-
tionales for these changes are that they better effect stockholders’
expectations and that they will result in more efficient judicial admin-
istration.267  However genuine these arguments may be, it cannot have
263. See Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 17–18; see also C. Barr Flinn & Kathaleen St. J.
McCormick, The Delaware Court of Chancery Endorses One Forum Motions as a Solution to
Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, CORP. COUNSELING & LITIG. (Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor,
LLP, Wilmington, Del.), Fall 2011, available at http://www.youngconaway.com//files//upload/
CorporateFall2011.pdf; Transcript of Teleconference, supra note 1, at 19–20.
264. See Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 17–18; see also C. Barr Flinn & Kathaleen St. J.
McCormick, supra note 263; Transcript of Teleconference, supra note 1, at 19–20.
265. Strine, Jr. et al., supra note 2, at 72–73.
266. Id. at 67, 74–75.
267. Id. at 5–6, 61–62, 67, 69, 74–75, 77–78.
954 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:911
escaped the Chief Justice and his co-authors that the Delaware Court
of Chancery would be the primary beneficiary of these changes.268
Delaware’s most recent attempt to attract and retain stockholder
litigation involves arbitration.  The Delaware legislature adopted a
process, codified at section 349, whereby stockholder litigation could,
at the election of the parties, be resolved in nonpublic binding arbitra-
tion presided over by sitting Court of Chancery judges.269  Although
the impetus for this statute is opaque,270 the purpose is clear.  The
usual role of arbitration in a state’s dispute resolution system is to
lighten the burden on the courts and to give civil parties a quicker
resolution.271  Section 349, by contrast, seems intended to retain in
Delaware arbitrations that otherwise would take place in other juris-
dictions, though there seems to be no real evidence of any significant
demand by corporate planners for arbitration nor any evidence of
competition for such arbitrations from other states.272  However, if
such a demand did develop, Delaware would likely approve the use of
mandatory arbitration provisions in the certificate of incorporation
and possibly the bylaws, by analogy to Chief Justice Strine’s decision
in Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.273  A trial
judge in Baltimore held that a mandatory arbitration bylaw covering
stockholder litigation against a Maryland pseudo-domestic entity was
valid under Maryland law.274  That decision, and the consequences of
Delaware’s approval of mandatory stockholder arbitration in section
349, were the subject of a critical appraisal by one of the most influen-
tial business journalists in the country.275  A dozen corporate law
professors filed affidavits in a companion case arguing that the bylaw
should be overturned.276
268. One co-author, Lawrence Hamermesh, is among the most distinguished corporate law
scholars, was a successful Delaware practitioner, and is currently a faculty member at the only
law school in Delaware.  The other co-author is a former law clerk to the Chief Justice.
269. Act of Apr. 2, 2009, ch. 8, § 1, 77 Del. Laws 9, 9 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 349 (2013), implemented by DEL. CT. CH. R. 96–98).
270. See Quinn, supra note 7, at 842.
271. Id. at 844.
272. Id. at 844, 862, 874.
273. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
274. Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No 24-C-13-001111, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct.
LEXIS 3, at *36–37 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013).
275. Alison Frankel, Wake Up, Shareholders! Your Rights May Be in Danger, REUTERS (June
25, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/25/us-column-frankel-shareholders-
idUSBRE95O1HO20130625.
276. Alison Frankel, Law Profs, Ex-SEC Chair Protest CommonWealth Arbitration Bylaw,
REUTERS (June 12, 2013, 8:27 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/06/12/law-profs-
ex-sec-chair-protest-commonwealth-arbitration-bylaw/.
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Section 349 was heavily criticized, most thoroughly by Brian Quinn,
on the grounds that it should not use sitting Court of Chancery judges
as arbitrators; that allowing confidential arbitration in stockholder liti-
gation settings would be deleterious to stockholders’ interests in gen-
eral; that confidential arbitration would erode the robustness of
Delaware common law and thus reduce the state-of-the-art quality of
Delaware jurisprudence; and that it would devalue Delaware’s corpo-
rate law advantage by undermining the network effects of Delaware
law among corporate law practitioners.277  More consequentially, a
citizens’ group successfully challenged section 349 on the ground that
it was the functional equivalent of a civil trial and thus subject to the
First Amendment right of access by the public.278
B. Delaware Should Enact a New Personal Jurisdiction Statute
The forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses bring to the fore
a question that Delaware has not dealt with since 1977: how to get
personal jurisdiction over nonresident officers and directors.  Even if
Delaware were not suggesting forum selection and arbitration clauses,
the personal jurisdiction issue would remain.  Obviously, though,
these clauses are closely allied with personal jurisdiction and it is strik-
ing that Delaware has not thought to address this head-on.  Delaware
judges and legislators have underappreciated the importance of per-
sonal jurisdiction in Delaware’s past and future success.
It is clear that corporate counsel understand that neither forum se-
lection nor arbitration clauses necessarily confer personal jurisdiction
over indispensable parties.  That knowledge is clear from the large
number of forum selection clauses that specify that the clause is effec-
tive only where the selected court has personal jurisdiction over indis-
pensable parties.279  Moreover, corporate planners affirmatively do
not wish to have officers and directors consent in advance to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of a forum that might not otherwise have personal
jurisdiction over them.  Of the hundreds of corporations that have
277. See generally Quinn, supra note 7.
278. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).  As the district
court summarized the case,
In the Delaware proceeding, the parties submit their dispute to a sitting judge acting
pursuant to state authority, paid by the state, and using state personnel and facilities;
the judge finds facts, applies the relevant law, determines the obligations of the parties;
and the judge then issues an enforceable order.  This procedure is sufficiently like a
civil trial that [the First Amendment] governs.
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012), aff’d, 733 F.3d 510.
279. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, STUDY OF DELAWARE FO-
RUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 4, 8–9 (2012).
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adopted forum selection bylaws and charter provisions, only one cor-
poration included a consent to personal jurisdiction provision for its
directors.280  That corporation subsequently amended its bylaws to
eliminate the forum selection and personal jurisdiction provisions.281
Delaware’s dominance in stockholder litigation, and New York’s
before it, were rooted in advantages in personal jurisdiction over cor-
porate fiduciaries.  Although it remains in effect, section 3114 is not
consistent with the Due Process Clause, and Delaware’s general long-
arm statute is not sufficient to make fiduciaries amendable to personal
jurisdiction.282  The statute is premised on implied consent, which the
Supreme Court of the United States has rejected for decades.  Fur-
ther, nonresident fiduciaries do not have sufficient connections to
Delaware such that litigation there comports with due process.  That is
true regardless of whether one accepts the “purposefully avails” prong
or the “fair play and substantial justice” prong for due process.283 That
means that Delaware must find a constitutional method for personal
jurisdiction, preferably one that has advantages over other states’ ap-
proaches and which those other states cannot easily replicate.
My proposed amenability statute is constitutional and workable.284
It would require each officer and director to consent to personal juris-
diction in the Delaware courts for actions arising from the officer’s or
director’s actions on behalf of the corporation.  That consent must be
made annually and personally by each officer and director and would
be filed by the corporation as part of its annual report.285  This kind of
actual consent clearly comports with the Due Process Clause and
could easily be implemented with appropriate legislation.286
If Delaware adopted this proposal, forum selection and arbitration
clauses would have considerably more force because plaintiffs could
be assured that all indispensable parties would be subject to Delaware
jurisdiction.  Even if corporations choose not to adopt forum selection
clauses or arbitration clauses, my proposed amenability statute would
280. CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, NEAL GERBER & EISENBERG LLP, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM
SELECTION IN CHARTERS AND BYLAWS 23 (2011) (Netlist, Inc. was the corporation).
281. Netlist, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 3.1 (Dec. 20, 2012).
282. See generally Chiappinelli, supra note 3.
283. See id.; see also Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Implications of Walden v. Fiore for Delaware’s
Officer and Director Consent Statute, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014), clsbluesky.law.col
umbia.edu/2014/03/12/the-implications-of-walden-v.-fiore-for-delawares-officer-and-director-con
sent-statute/.
284. See id. at 835–44.
285. Id. at 835–39.
286. Id. at 839–44.
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help plaintiffs and thereby Delaware because it would replace the
constitutionally impermissible section 3114 approach.
More importantly for Delaware’s quest to remain the center of stock-
holder litigation, the new amenability statute’s effectiveness could not
be duplicated by other states.  Obviously, every other state could
adopt such a statute, but the practical effect of such a statute is expo-
nentially more valuable to Delaware than to other states because of
Delaware’s advantage in pseudo-domestic corporations.  More than
80% of pseudo-domestic corporations are incorporated in Delaware.
Nevada, the next most popular state for such corporations, has less
than 9%.287  Delaware can implement an approach to personal juris-
diction that is certain of application and which would be of value only
to Delaware.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Delaware legal establishment believes, with good reason, that
stockholder litigation that once was routinely and nearly exclusively
filed in Delaware is now litigated in multiple fora instead.  The Court
of Chancery judges and the Delaware General Assembly have been
actively engaged in efforts to both entice and coerce this litigation
back to Delaware.  What has been underappreciated, by both those in
Delaware and those in academia, is that Delaware’s role as the center
of stockholder litigation came relatively late, came by default, and is
quite fragile.  That is, Delaware was the center of pseudo-domestic
incorporations by 1920 but was not the center of stockholder litigation
until forty years later.  That centering only came about when New
York, the original center, began to actively discourage stockholder liti-
gation.  Perhaps the most underappreciated aspect of this story is that
both New York’s success and Delaware’s was largely caused by their
inimitable advantage in personal jurisdiction over fiduciaries.  Dela-
ware’s current approach to personal jurisdiction is unconstitutional
and it has no other viable system.
Although Delaware has taken several steps to ensure that stock-
holder litigation remains centered there, it should adopt my proposed
actual consent statute for personal jurisdiction over corporate fiducia-
ries.  Doing so would give Delaware an additional weapon, and one
that cannot be effectively replicated by other states, to attract and re-
tain litigation in Delaware.
287. Barzuza & Smith, supra note 8, at 39–40 tbl.1.  As of 2011, Maryland (1.52%) is the only
other state that has more than 1%  of the total pseudo-domestic incorporations. Id.
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